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One of the most remarkable developments in interna-
tional commercial law over the last fifty years has
been the gradual acceptance of the existence of a new
'merchant law, ' or lex mercatoria, spontaneously gen-
erated by the international community in the shadow
of national legal orders. While the notion that there
might be law beyond the state aroused the interest of
legal scholars around the world, few wondered
whether international commercial actors had a genu-
ine interest in the development of an autonomous
transnational law. This Article offers empirical evi-
dence suggesting that commercial parties almost nev-
er freely opt into lex mercatoria, but instead select a
particular national law to govern their contracts.
This conclusion begs the question of whether anybody
else might benefit from lex mercatoria.
In a groundbreaking article published in 2005, Chris-
topher Drahozal argued that the idea had lost practi-
cal significance and offered a signaling theory of lex
mercatoria: the interest in the idea can be explained
by the desire of would-be arbitrators to market them-
selves. While essentially agreeing with Drahozal, this
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Article offers two other theories explaining the devel-
opment of lex mercatoria. First, I argue that deciding
disputes on the basis of lex mercatoria can bring im-
portant benefits to international arbitrators. If that is
the case, though, their interests may conflict with
those of the parties who hired them. That raises a se-
rious agency problem that threatens the legitimacy of
the international arbitration system as a whole. Sec-
ond, I demonstrate how lex mercatoria can benefit or-
ganizations that are involved in the business of pro-
ducing model contracts, and maintain that the active
promotion of non-state law-side-stepping mandatory
rules of national law-is intended to reduce the costs
of producing international model contracts by such
organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
Do international merchants or commercial actors want to
break free from the laws of states and replace them with their own
trade usages and commercial customs? Do they want to take control
of the making of commercial law to provide their community a more
efficient, unified transnational commercial law?
One of the most remarkable developments in international
commercial law over the last fifty years has been the gradual ac-
ceptance of the existence of a new "merchant law," or lex mercato-
ria, spontaneously generated by the international community in the
shadow of national legal orders. This new lex mercatoria is com-
posed of commercial customs, but also includes a variety of other in-
ternational norms that are regularly respected by international com-
mercial actors.' The idea of an autonomous transnational
commercial law was first proposed by a handful of European scholars
in the 1960s. 2 It has since become a reality, insofar as some states
1. Lex mercatoria was originally a body of rules and principles laid down by traveling
merchants throughout the medieval and Renaissance periods to regulate their dealings. See,
e.g., Roy GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE & EWAN McKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LAW-TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 12 (2007). Whether modem lex mercatoria truly
compares with medieval lex mercatoria is disputed by historians. See infra note 35.
2. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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have endorsed lex mercatoria. For example, most arbitration laws
accept that parties may subject their contracts to lex mercatoria, and
international commercial arbitrators regularly apply it. Moreover,
national courts will typically confirm and enforce arbitral awards
rendered on the basis of lex mercatoria.3
This limited but undisputable recognition of lex mercatoria
by national legal orders aroused the interest of legal scholars and the-
orists around the world: the notion that there might be law beyond
the state raised new and fascinating theoretical legal issues. Was this
"law" a limited collection of rules, or a new legal order? Was it
genuinely independent from national rules, or was it in fact largely
fed by state norms? In any case, could such "law" exist at all with-
out being at least tolerated, if not supported, by states?
While these debates were raging, surprisingly little attention
was paid to the actors purportedly subject to this new lex mercatoria.
Few wondered whether international commercial actors had a genu-
ine interest in the development of an autonomous transnational law. 4
The reason for this neglect was perhaps that the answer seemed just
too obvious: as lex mercatoria was, by definition, the product of the
common practices and customs of international merchants, it simply
had to be their preferred rule of law because it represented their best
and most efficient behaviors.
That question should have been asked, because the answer,
far from being obvious, seems to be that international merchants do
not benefit from lex mercatoria. Indeed, the little empirical evidence
available suggests that commercial parties almost never freely opt in
to lex mercatoria, but instead select a particular national law to gov-
ern their contracts. This conclusion begs the question of whether an-
ybody else might benefit from lex mercatoria, and indeed whether
this fascinating idea has any practical significance today.
I begin this paper by introducing the concept of the new lex
mercatoria in Part I. I then explore, in Part II, whether that concept
meets the needs of the international business community, concluding
that its norms are too vague and incomplete for that purpose. In that
regard, I present data from the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) showing that parties to international commercial contracts pro-
vide for the application of lex mercatoria in less than 1% of the cases
brought before the ICC's Court of International Arbitration.
I then consider, in Part III, the groundbreaking article pub-
3. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
4. An important exception is Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National
Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 523 (2005).
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lished in 2005 by Christopher Drahozal, in which he concluded that
the data on the contractual practices of international merchants sug-
gests that lex mercatoria has simply lost practical significance, if it
ever had any.5 He argued that the interest in the idea-outside of ac-
ademic circles-could be explained by the desire of would-be arbi-
trators to market themselves. Although I find his signaling theory of
lex mercatoria convincing, I have an important disagreement with
Drahozal: I do not agree that the doctrine of lex mercatoria has lost
all practical significance. To the contrary, I find that it remains very
much alive, and not only at international conferences. Both national
legislators and arbitral institutions have empowered international ar-
bitrators to resort to lex mercatoria in cases where the parties have
remained silent on the law governing their contract, and significant
anecdotal evidence suggests that arbitrators regularly make use of
this power.
In Parts IV and V, therefore, I speculate as to whether other
actors in the arbitral process might have an interest in the develop-
ment of a transnational commercial law and articulate the two central
arguments of this Article. First, in Part IV, I argue that deciding dis-
putes on the basis of lex mercatoria can bring important benefits to
international arbitrators. If that is the case, though, their interests
may conflict with those of the parties who hired them. That raises a
serious agency problem that threatens the legitimacy of the interna-
tional arbitration system as a whole.
Second, in Part V, I demonstrate how lex mercatoria can ben-
efit organizations that are involved in the business of producing mod-
el contracts. The clearest example is the International Chamber of
Commerce, which has been actively promoting lex mercatoria by en-
couraging parties to subject their contracts to non-state law. I main-
tain that the active promotion of the use of non-state law, which side-
steps mandatory rules of national law, is intended to reduce the costs
of producing international model contracts by such organizations.
I. THE MANY FACES OF LEXMERCA TORiA
The claim that there is an autonomous transnational commer-
cial law can be understood in many different ways. In its least con-
troversial form, the claim could merely be that commercial customs
and usages should be recognized and used to define the contractual
obligations of the parties in the absence of other written indications
5. See id.
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of intent.6 The applicable national commercial law would either al-
low the incorporation of business norms in private contracts, or pro-
vide for their direct application in certain defined circumstances. In
the United States, for instance, § 1-201(3) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code provides that the agreement of the parties is "the bargain of
the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other
circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade." 7 A similar rule is found in the commercial law of
most other countries.
Lex mercatoria scholars have made, since the 1960s, a much
broader and more far-reaching claim. Not only do these scholars
recognize that commercial actors may autonomously produce some
norms, they further argue for far greater autonomy from national le-
gal orders. They do not limit the scope of lex mercatoria to those in-
stances in which states have traditionally allowed business norms to
be taken into account, but have instead claimed that business norms
could be the only source of applicable rule, entirely displacing na-
tional commercial law. As far-reaching and remarkable as that may
seem, this second understanding of the autonomy of transnational
commercial law is now widely accepted. International commercial
arbitration has played an instrumental role in this regard.8 States first
allowed international arbitration to be largely autonomous, agreeing
to enforce foreign arbitral awards without reviewing them on the
merits.9  They then permitted arbitrators to decide international
commercial disputes solely on the basis of lex mercatoria. 10 The re-
sult is that it is now widely accepted that parties may choose lex mer-
catoria as the governing law for their contracts if they also provide
for arbitration, and that arbitral awards made in such circumstances
will be enforced in most jurisdictions.
6. See, e.g., Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law,
46 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1997).
7. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2012).
8. Despite the critical importance of international commercial arbitration in the
development of lex mercatoria, the focus of this paper is on the privatization of lawmaking,
not dispute resolution. As noted by Drahozal, the private ordering literature has traditionally
been concerned with instances where privately created norms were also enforced privately.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2009); see also Barack D. Richman, Firms, Courts and
Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 2328 (2004); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 1181
(2003).
9. 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. 5, Sept. 30, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
10. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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From the perspective of commercial actors, there is a crucial
difference between the recognition of business norms through nation-
al commercial law and the claim of complete autonomy therefrom
made by lex mercatoria advocates. In the former case, national
commercial law remains available as a default. Thus, commercial
parties may still rely on the existence of clear and detailed rules of
applicable national law if custom or the contract is incomplete. In
the latter case, however, no such backstop exists, such that it is nec-
essary to believe in the completeness of lex mercatoria.
Intuitively, commercial parties should prefer to have national
commercial law remain applicable as a backstop. In Part I.A, I first
show that, unsurprisingly, most instances of private ordering corre-
spond to this model. With that in mind, I then present the expansive-
ly far-reaching doctrines of lex mercatoria scholars in Part I.B.
A. Lex Mercatoria and Freedom of Contract
The laws of the vast majority of countries offer various tools
allowing commercial parties to design private normative regimes.
The most important of those tools is the freedom of contract. Parties
may write detailed contracts reflecting the terms and conditions of
their arrangement as well as their preferences in the event of a default
or other issue, and such terms will generally displace the default rules
of the applicable law. As already noted, commercial law often rec-
ognizes business norms by allowing the use of commercial customs
and usages for the purpose of supplementing commercial contracts or
interpreting their terms when the contract itself is unclear on the rele-
vant point.
The literature on private ordering shows that commercial par-
ties willing to design private normative regimes do so by relying on
their freedom of contract. Such parties will sometimes write detailed
contracts for particular transactions; more often, they will simply re-
sort to contractual forms widely used in their industry. Despite their
desire to subject their transactions to norms that they have produced,
these parties do not typically claim that their private regime should
be self-sufficient and thus completely displace the otherwise applica-
ble commercial law. On the contrary, however detailed such con-
tracts might be, they will typically include a choice of law clause
providing for the application of a national law, which shows that the
parties recognize that their contract remains governed by a national
law and that the source of their power to design a private normative
regime is a rule of that national law that recognizes the freedom of
contract.
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Most instances of private ordering studied by legal scholars
correspond to this model. A seminal article by Lisa Bernstein re-
vealed that the American grain and feed industry has produced de-
tailed substantive trade rules through its trade association, the Na-
tional Grain and Feed Association (NGFA), for over a century."
These various rules, which were initially meant to codify the customs
of the industry and which still claim to "reflect trade practices,"' 2
govern all NGFA member contracts.13 NGFA membership is condi-
tioned upon the member agreeing to submit all disputes with other
members to the NGFA's arbitration system. NGFA arbitrators de-
cide such disputes by applying the relevant NGFA rules. Those rules
are typically sufficient, as disputes over unforeseen contingencies
seem rare. 14 Notwithstanding that, although it might appear that the
NGFA is almost entirely self-regulated, the grain and feed industry
has never claimed complete autonomy from national legal systems.
For the American NGFA, the question is whether the industry claims
autonomy from American commercial law. But NGFA arbitrators
have, in the rare cases in which the contract, trade rules, and trade
practices have proven insufficient to resolve a given dispute, repeat-
edly relied on the Uniform Commercial Code or other applicable
statutes. 15
Similarly, the international trade association of the industry,
the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), has also produced
private norms in the form of dozens of model contracts that are
commonly used in the industry. 16 These model contracts all include
an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under the GAFTA rules
by qualified arbitrators with extensive experience in commodities
trading. In an international environment, GAFTA could have been
tempted to claim full autonomy from national legal systems: it did
not. Although GAFTA model contracts exclude the application of
concurrent state norms such as international commercial conventions,
they still provide that they "shall be construed and take effect in ac-
cordance with the law of England,"' 7 where GAFTA has its seat.
11. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
12. Id. at 1772 (underscoring that "however, changes in unwritten customary practices
have not been the primary motivation for trade rules amendments").
13. Id. at 1773.
14. Id. at 1774.
15. See the arbitral awards cited by Lisa Bernstein, supra note 11, at 1777, n.41.
16. As recognized by the English Court of Appeal in Soufflet Negoce v. Bunge SA.
[2010] EWCA Civ 1102.
17. See, e.g., GAFTA Contract No. 64, General Contract for Grain in Bulk, art. 24
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Another example of an industry that has generated many of
the rules governing transactions between its members is the private-
ly-negotiated derivatives industry.' 8 Unlike other financial products,
swaps and other derivatives are not traded over an organized ex-
change. As a consequence, these transactions largely fall outside of
the scope of securities regulation, which was designed to regulate ex-
change activity. Thus, the industry is essentially regulated by the
contracts that its members conclude. In 1985, the repeat players in
the industry established the International Swaps and Derivatives As-
sociation (ISDA), which now has more than 800 members from fifty-
eight countries and six continents.19 One of ISDA's most important
contributions was to develop the ISDA Master Agreement, a model
contract. This detailed, periodically revised agreement is used as an
umbrella contract, and is thus accompanied by transaction-specific
documents. Because it is so widely used, it is perceived as defining
key practices, rights, and obligations in the industry. 20 ISDA pre-
sents its contract as "the authoritative contract" used in the industry,
which "has established international contractual standards governing
privately negotiated derivatives transactions." 21
Some argue that the ISDA Master Agreement is a set of pri-
vate rules that actually regulates the industry-a comprehensive code
of self-regulation-because the norms to be followed by industry ac-
tors all seemed to originate from it.22 In that sense, it could be pre-
sented as a form of lex mercatoria.23 But this transnational set of
norms has never claimed complete autonomy from national legal sys-
tems; rather, the ISDA Master Agreement is expressly governed by a
national law. The industry is acutely aware of the fact that national
insolvency laws may claim competence and may, in an appropriate
case, invalidate some of the clauses of the Master Agreement. 24
ISDA's reaction, however, is not to claim any autonomy from these
(2006).
18. Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge,
and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008).
19. See INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Ass'N, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda (last
visited Jan. 4, 2012).
20. See Riles, supra note 18, at 609; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1129,1140 (2006).
21. See INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, http://www2.isda.org/
functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions (last visited Jan. 4th, 2012).
22. Hugh Collins, Flipping Wreck: Lex Mercatoria on the Shoals of lus Cogens, in
CONTRACT GOVERNANCE (S. Grundmann, K. Riesenhuber & F. M6slein eds.) (forthcoming).
23. Id.
24. Riles, supra note 18, at 614.
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laws, but rather to lobby governments to amend them25 by seeking,
among other legislative acts, the conclusion of an international treaty
ensuring the enforceability of choice of law clauses in contracts such
as the Master Agreement. 26 Furthermore, unlike certain other in-
stances of private ordering, the derivatives industry lacks an autono-
mous dispute resolution mechanism. When disputes arise, parties go
to national courts, which will not automatically or even necessarily
defer to the private norms of the industry, but might instead invali-
date critical clauses of the Master Agreement.27 If the ISDA Master
Agreement has generated a financial lex mercatoria, it was clearly
not autonomous from national legal orders but rather subjected to
them.
It is probable that many other such examples exist.28 It is un-
clear, however, whether this kind of private ordering ought to be
characterized as lex mercatoria. On the one hand, transactions be-
tween members of the industry are, in effect, regulated by sets of
norms, which were privately produced and are common to most, if
not all, actors worldwide. 29 On the other hand, technically speaking,
those norms are contracts governed by national commercial laws. 30
For the purpose of this Article, however, it is unnecessary to decide.
I am concerned with the special issues raised by the claim that parties
might want to displace national laws entirely and to be solely gov-
erned by transnational business norms.
B. Lex Mercatoria as an Alternative to National Commercial Laws
In 1964, Berthold Goldman published the first in a series of
25. Id.
26. Id. at 615.
27. As a U.S. bankruptcy court did in the Lehman Brothers litigation. See Lehman
Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., No. 09-01242, 2011 WL 9375423
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2010). See also Collins, supra note 22.
28. At the same time, there are examples of industries in which trade associations
failed to come to a consensus in developing trade rules. See Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 717 (1999).
29. For some authors, this is enough to speak of a lex mercatoria. See, e.g., Collins,
supra note 22.
30. Scholars have often challenged the existence of lex mercatoria on the ground that
most instances of private ordering amount to nothing more than private contracts that remain
governed by national laws. See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Party Autonomy and Private-
Law Making in Private International Law: The Lex Mercatoria that Isn't, in LIBER
AMICORUMK.D. KERAMEUS 1379 (2009).
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articles in which he eventually argued that transnational commerce
had generated not only a new transnational commercial law, but an
actual transnational legal order that was autonomous from national
laws and could displace such laws to govern international business
transactions. 3 1
The claim that business norms could be elevated to the status
of law and could, therefore, govern transactions independently from
national laws was remarkable. Goldman supported his argument by
pointing to historical precedent. In the 1960s, it was widely believed
that, in medieval times, the rules governing transnational commerce
were essentially the customs followed in the community of interna-
tional merchants, and that this lex mercatoria was autonomous from
any state. 32 Goldman presented his doctrine as a simple revival of
this medieval concept of lex mercatoria. At the same time, another
European scholar, Clive Schmitthoff, was also drawing parallels be-
tween the medieval lex mercatoria and the contemporary unification
of international commercial law.33 Together, Goldman and
Schmitthoff are now widely considered as the intellectual fathers of
the new lex mercatoria.34 Despite obvious similarities, their doc-
trines and approaches were not identical: the idea of complete au-
tonomy of transnational commercial law was essentially, if not exclu-
sively, promoted by Goldman and students.
Over the next fifty years, Goldman's and Schmitthoff's ideas
would be harshly criticized. Legal historians challenged the notion
that medieval lex mercatoria was ever genuinely autonomous from
state legal orders,35 and legal scholars vehemently denied the exist-
31. Berthold Goldman, Frontidres du Droit et << Lex Mercatoria >, 9 ARCH. DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (1964); Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats
et l'arbitrage internationaux: realit etperspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT'L 475, 499 (1979);
Berthold Goldman, Nouvelles Riflexions sur la Lex Mercatoria, in tTUDES DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL EN L'HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE 241 (Helbing & Lichtenhahn SA, eds.
1993).
32. Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Unification of the Law of International Trade, 1968 J.
Bus. L. 105 (1968).
33. Id.
34. On the historiography of the new Lex Mercatoria, see Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The
Many Lives-and Faces-of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International
Business Law, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2008).
35. See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 447, 453 (2007) (citing Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the
Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427, 446-47 (1999));
Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the
Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 21, 27-29 (2004).
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ence of any transnational commercial legal order.36 Nevertheless,
their theories survived, and Goldman's suggestion that the new lex
mercatoria was completely autonomous proved extraordinarily suc-
cessful. As international arbitration grew and states became interest-
ed in competing for its associated benefits, lawmakers adopted a va-
riety of rules based on this proposition. Thus, national arbitration
laws empowered arbitrators to decide disputes solely on the basis of
lex mercatoria,37 and national courts enforced arbitral awards made
thereunder. 38
Today, lex mercatoria is a legal reality in international com-
mercial arbitration. Its content, however, is much debated, and has
evolved since the 1960s. Most international arbitration scholars ac-
cept that there are two alternative approaches towards assessing the
content of lex mercatoria: the list method and the functional meth-
od. 39
1. The List Method
Despite the claim that modern lex mercatoria revived medie-
val lex mercatoria, it was immediately obvious to its proponents that
commercial customs, which were central to the concept in medieval
times, were not particularly numerous in an era in which states pro-
duce so much commercial law. If lex mercatoria were to have any
36. Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la lex mercatoria, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS
ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES: ETUDES OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 123 (1987);
Georges R. Delaume, The Proper Law of State Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria: A
Reappraisal, 3 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 79, 81 (1988) (noting that critics argue
"Lex Mercatoria is a myth without substance").
37. See, for example, the influential 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, art. 28. As of October 11, 2013, the law has been at least partially
adopted in sixty-seven countries. See Status of UNICTRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral
texts/arbitration/I 985Modelarbitrationstatus.html.
38. See, e.g., Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft M.B.H. (F/Germ) v.
R'AS Al Khaimah Nat'l Oil Co. (R'AS Al Khaimah, UAE) Shell Int'l Petroleum Co. Ltd.
(UK) [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023 (UK); Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland SA c/
Primary, Cass. Civ. 16re, 22 Oct. 1991, J. DROIT INT'L 177 (1992) (Fr.); Oberster
Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], 18 Nov. 1982, reproduced in IX YB COMM ARB 161
(1984); see also David Rivkin, Enforceability ofArbitral Awards Based on Lex Mercatoria,
9 ARB. INT'L 67 (1993).
39. See, e.g., NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
H. HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 218, T 3-173 (2009);
Michael Pryles, Application of Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 31
U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 319, 321 (2008).
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significance, it would have to draw from other sources. Hence, from
the outset, proponents suggested reliance on a variety of norms or
practices that were reasonably global and could be included without
overly contradicting the original concept of a law spontaneously gen-
erated by the international business community. 40 Although a few
scholars still consider that modern lex mercatoria should be limited
to commercial customs, 4 1 there is wide acceptance among arbitration
scholars and practitioners of the need to incorporate a number of oth-
er norms.42
To begin with, it is understood that one may refer to widely-
adopted international commercial treaties such as the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG). 43 Although one may argue that treaties are state law such
that including them contradicts the precept of a law autonomous from
national legal orders, the underlying rationale is that such treaties
govern a high number of international transactions and constitute, to
a large extent, the actual law of international business transactions.
In the same vein, public international law is also often cited as a po-
tential source of lex mercatoria, despite the fact that private actors
have not traditionally been considered subjects of international law.
Further, contractual practices, including model contracts, are com-
monly accepted as legitimate sources of lex mercatoria. This propo-
sition is probably the most controversial, since contractual practices
and model contracts have no authority unless they have been adopted
by the parties or are so widely used that they become trade usages.
Finally, it is widely accepted that lex mercatoria includes general
principles of law.44 The original idea behind this proposition was
that, if some principles were common to all nations and could be
found in public international law, it was safe to assume that they
would also belong to lex mercatoria. Some arbitral tribunals en-
dorsed this view and expressly relied on general principles of law.
This reliance, in turn, confirmed the status of the principles as a
source of lex mercatoria, since they had now been recognized by in-
ternational trade adjudicators. Before long, it was clear that this
source would remain accessory, from a practical point of view, as it
40. See Goldman, Frontidres du droit, supra note 31.
41. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 6, at 16.
42. See, e.g., Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration,
34 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1985); Lord Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The
First Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB. INT'L 86, 109 (1988); Pryles, supra note 39, at 320.
43. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 1989 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISGI.
44. See Mustill, supra note 42, at 109; Pryles, supra note 39, at 320.
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appeared that international arbitral tribunals had only identified a few
dozen of such general principles. 45
Such a wealth of sources, however, was unlikely to translate
into an easily accessible code of transnational commercial law. A re-
cent trend in the development of the new lex mercatoria has been to
codify it and to try to put it into a user-friendly, or perhaps simply
usable, form. Professor Klaus Peter Berger has been working to
identify all of the rules which can be deduced from the various ac-
cepted sources of lex mercatoria and putting them into one single,
open-ended set of rules and principles. 46 This process of "creeping
codification" has resulted in a list which, in 2010, contained around a
hundred principles. 47 Some of them are reasonably precise and
would certainly offer adjudicators rules of decision enabling them to
settle many disputes. Others, however, are so vague that they would
hardly offer guidance to any party or arbitrator. 48
Similarly, the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT) sponsored the work of a dozen academics
interested in producing an international restatement of contract law.
The UNIDROIT project was, however, quite different from Professor
Berger's attempt to codify lex mercatoria, as the UNIDROIT work-
ing group did not focus on the sources of lex mercatoria, but rather
used different national contract laws as its starting point. Indeed, the
working group did not hesitate to adopt solutions which were rather
rare in comparative contract law.49 Nevertheless, the resulting
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UNIDROIT Principles) are a coherent and complete code of contract
law, comparable to many national laws. 50 Despite the fact that they
do not originate from customs and rules actually followed by com-
45. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEXMERCATORIA
(1st ed. 1999) (39 principles); Mustill, supra note 42, at 91 (20 principles).
46. See BERGER, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Principle IV.4.1 on Forms Requirements, id. at 383:
No IV.4.1 - Principle of informality:
(a) Contractual declarations are valid even when they are not evidenced
in writing unless mandatory rules of any applicable domestic law
provide otherwise.
(b) Parties to international business contracts may not insist on undue
formalism without any good reason.
49. For instance, the working group endorsed the right to ask for renegotiation of
contracts in case of hardship, which is rejected by many national laws, and was, as a
consequence, rejected by the drafters of the CISG too.
50. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT],
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010).
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mercial parties in international business transactions, the preamble of
the UNIDROIT Principles states that "[t]hey may be applied when
the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general
principles of law, lex mercatoria or the like."51 In fact, a small but
growing number of parties and arbitrators use them as rules of deci-
sion in international commercial disputes. The new lex mercatoria
might be slowly entering into a new era, one that some have already
labeled the "new, new, lex mercatoria,"52 where it will be increas-
ingly more accessible and usable, but also distinct from commercial
customs and practices.
2. The Functional Method
In a series of influential articles, Emmanuel Gaillard, a
French academic and leading international arbitration practitioner,
proposed an entirely different approach for assessing the content of
lex mercatoria.53 He argued that lex mercatoria ought to be consid-
ered as a method of decision-making rather than as a list of rules.
When deciding disputes on the basis of lex mercatoria, arbitrators
ought to conduct a comparative analysis and assess how the majority
of the national laws connected to the dispute would resolve it. Arbi-
trators should then apply this widely-accepted solution, the inference
being that the fact that the application of a rule common to most na-
tional legal orders would not come as a surprise to commercial par-
ties.
Despite the ongoing debate on its actual content, the concept
of a modern lex mercatoria-one largely autonomous from national
laws-is now widely accepted. Most sophisticated jurisdictions now
acknowledge, through national law, that commercial parties may
provide for its application and empower international arbitrators to
decide disputes according to its rules and principles.54 The purpose
of this Article, however, is to ask both how and why the concept de-
veloped and remains alive half a century after its (re)birth: is it be-
cause it gave a unique opportunity to commercial actors to design the
51. Id.
52. Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mercatoria, or Back to the Future, 17 ARB. INT'L
121 (2001).
53. Emmanuel Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective
Application of Transnational Rules, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 208 (1995)
[hereinafter Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria]; Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational
Law: A Legal System or a Method ofDecision Making?, 17 ARB. INT'L 59 (2001).
54. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commerical Arbitration art. 28.
(1985).
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best legal regime for their transactions? Or, have other actors had in-
centives to promote the idea of an autonomous transnational com-
mercial law?
II. DOES LEXMERCATORIA MEET THE NEEDS OF COMMERCIAL
ACTORS?
While scholars hotly debated the nature and content of lex
mercatoria, the reasons why the concept developed and whether it
was beneficial for actors were little explored. One reason might be
that the answer seemed obvious. The original claim was that lex
mercatoria was a set of rules generated by the merchant or commer-
cial community for itself with custom and commercial practices both
central to its definition. Thus, it followed that lex mercatoria simply
had to meet the needs of commercial actors, as it could be safely as-
sumed that they would have designed rules which fit their needs.
However, as previously explained, lex mercatoria has numer-
ous sources, many of which are not directly generated by the com-
munity of merchants. Thus, in the following pages, I argue that the
features of the modern lex mercatoria make it highly unlikely that it
meets the needs of international merchants, and I present empirical
evidence that they rarely choose its application.
A. An Economic Analysis ofLex Mercatoria Reducing Transaction
Costs
Intuitively, one would think that the main reason commercial
actors would want their international contracts to be governed by lex
mercatoria would be to reduce transaction costs.55 Concluding inter-
national contracts appears more costly than concluding domestic con-
tracts because international contracts raise the specific issue of choice
of law: the law governing an international contract must be deter-
mined. As most legal systems give commercial actors the freedom to
choose the applicable law, that means that commercial actors should
agree on the law governing their contract, and draft an appropriate
clause to that effect. They must, therefore, dedicate additional re-
sources to the negotiation of that particular clause.
55. See Jilrgen Basedow, Lex Mercatoria and the Private International Law of
Contracts in Economic Perspective, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw 63 (Iirgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex
Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EuR. PUB. POL'Y 627, 634 (2006).
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1. The Relevance of Parties' Legal Sophistication
At the outset, it is important to underscore that this argument
is based on the assumption that the parties do, in fact, care about
which law should govern their contract. They certainly ought to.
The applicable law will provide default rules, which will control in
the absence of any specific contractual provisions. Both parties
should know and understand the consequences of such default rules
in order to determine whether they fit the parties' particular needs
and, if not, the parties must draft appropriate clauses providing oth-
erwise. Moreover, the applicable law will provide mandatory rules
that may invalidate some of the parties' contractual provisions and, in
the worst case scenario, void the entire contract.
Yet it would be foolish to believe that all parties concluding
contracts, even international commercial actors, fully appreciate the
importance of the applicable law. Most of them are, after all, busi-
nessmen, and although some may have legal training, most will not,
and still others might have no higher education at all. In other words,
not all international commercial parties are sophisticated from a legal
point of view. Some simply do not care about the law governing
their contract. That means that they typically do not spend time or
effort wondering what the applicable law for the particular contract
might be, and they certainly do not expend any significant resources
to determine it. Such an attitude clearly generates risks that are obvi-
ous (and somewhat disconcerting) to any lawyer. But the business
people's lack of interest in the subject is not without advantages:
such parties incur fewer transaction costs when concluding contracts.
In particular, they do not incur additional transaction costs when con-
cluding international contracts because they do not see the choice of
law issue.56 And, indeed, in many cases, there will not be any nega-
tive consequence of such lack of interest, as no dispute may arise in
connection with the transaction or, if one does, it may be resolved by
way of negotiation.
Similarly, the law governing the contract may simply be ig-
nored by parties who, although they may appreciate its importance,
might think that they cannot afford to incur the costs necessary to de-
56. Not seeing the issue does not necessarily mean that such parties would not include
choice of law clauses in their contracts. Rather, they might do so because contracts with
which they have experience may have choice of law clauses or they may have seen or heard
of other actors including such clauses and so feel that they should as well, or because they do
not see the point of fighting about the issue with the other party. Indeed, they may feel that
by accepting the law of the other party, they will be in a stronger position when negotiating
other terms of the contract that, for them, are more important.
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termine the applicable law. In other words, the value of a particular
transaction may not justify dedicating resources to determining the
applicable law. In such cases, the parties, whether they are legally
sophisticated or not, may conduct a cost-benefit analysis and choose
to ignore the issue altogether. But the result is the same: the parties
dedicate no resources to resolve, in advance, which law will govern
the contract. Thus, they do not incur higher costs when concluding
international contracts.
Are there many parties falling within either of these two cate-
gories? In the absence of any empirical study, that is almost impos-
sible to know.57 The answer might well vary depending on the par-
ties (including, perhaps, their perception of the local law generally
applicable thereto), the industries, and the value of the transactions.
In any event, there is certainly a large number of sophisticated inter-
national commercial parties, and we focus on them.
2. The Additional Cost of International Contracting
For parties who fully appreciate the importance of the law
governing their contract, international contracting should be more
costly than domestic contracting. Initially, as already mentioned,
parties to an international contract must provide for the applicable
law. The first additional cost, therefore, is the time and resources
spent negotiating and drafting a choice of law clause. For genuinely
sophisticated parties, however, that cost is unlikely to be the only
cost (not even the only negotiation and drafting cost), and certainly
not the highest one. In order to fully appreciate the consequences of
agreeing on the application of one law or the other, the parties ought
to know and understand the provisions of the laws that might be cho-
sen, meaning that the lawyers of the parties should advise them on
the differences between-at a minimum-all potential laws connect-
ed to the particular transaction. However, as many legal systems do
not limit the parties' freedom to choose the law governing their inter-
national commercial transaction to only those laws related to the
transaction,58 one could argue that the parties' counsel should even
57. Yet, legal scholars commonly wonder why "sophisticated parties" frequently omit
particular clauses that seem to be extremely important to the scholars. See, e.g., Geoffrey P.
Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOzO L. REv. 2073, 2093
n.138 (2009).
58. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), art. 3
[hereinafter Rome I Regulation]; Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falu Shiyong Fa (6, A R $ A
85 &it M & ) [Law Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the
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advise them on all unrelated laws of the world, not just a few of
them, in order to allow the client to negotiate for the most beneficial.
Quite clearly, if that were the case, the mere preparatory work neces-
sary to begin negotiating the choice of law provision would be pro-
hibitive while dramatically increasing the transaction costs.5 9
Whether and how much preparatory research is actually con-
ducted by the parties' lawyers before negotiating most international
contracts remains unclear. 60 It is much clearer, however, that when
the parties eventually reach an agreement on a given national law,
such law will be foreign to at least one of them. If that party had al-
ready asked his lawyers to advise him on the peculiarities of that law
before or during the negotiation, the costs associated therewith would
have already been incurred. 61 If not, such research would have to be
conducted after reaching the agreement. Regardless of when such
research is conducted (e.g., either before or after the negotiation and
the conclusion of the contract), at least one of the parties needs to in-
cur the cost of learning a foreign law.
Thus, international contracting has an additional cost resulting
from the absence of an international contract law. If such a law ex-
isted-and if it applied automatically to international contracts-
parties would not need to concern themselves with the law governing
their transaction. They could either ignore the issue or specifically
refer to such international law in a choice of law provision that is
minimally negotiated (if at all). Further, as an international regime, it
would be familiar to all, such that no party would need to learn it.
Finally, if such an international regime were embodied in an interna-
tional treaty, it would become part of the laws of the contracting
states, and would thus become an international transaction law com-
mon to all of them.
This cost reduction argument can be made for any interna-
tional law regime. It works, and was often made, in connection with
international treaties such as the CISG. But it works equally well for
a body of international law produced by private, international trade
Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011) art. 41,
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/textjsp?file-id=20661 1 (China).
59. Basedow, supra note 55, at 67 (citing EVA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB DER
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT 287 (2002)).
60. Id.
61. For purposes of this paper, we must leave aside the question of whether a lawyer
negotiating a choice of law provision without knowing and understanding the implications of
the law of the jurisdictions under negotiation commits malpractice under the rules of
professional conduct applicable to such lawyer.
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actors such as lex mercatoria.62
It should be noted, however, that at least one cost of interna-
tional contracting would not necessarily disappear even if an interna-
tional law regime existed: most international commercial laws are
just default rules that apply automatically only if the parties do not
provide a different applicable law.63 International commercial laws
are not, therefore, mandatory in character, and the parties may ex-
clude their application.64 That means that if they so desire, contract-
ing parties may still decide to compare solutions offered by applica-
ble international law against national laws and choose a national law
which better suits their needs. Of course, the parties would never be
obliged to undertake the research necessary to make such a compari-
son; they could avoid any such expense by simply accepting the in-
ternational legal regime.
3. The Necessary Features of International Commercial Law
The claim that the existence of an international legal regime
for commercial transactions reduces the cost of international con-
tracting is based on the assumption that international commercial law
can be used as an alternative to national contract law. The argument
rests on the notion that parties to international contracts would wel-
come the application of international law in lieu of national law be-
cause it would allow them to save some of the cost generated by ne-
gotiating and applying a national law. The argument is obviously
based on an underlying assumption that all things are otherwise
equal. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that intema-
tional laws and national laws are otherwise comparable, such that it is
not otherwise more costly to subject one's contract to international
commercial law.
Choosing international commercial law over national com-
mercial law, then, would only be beneficial if international law has
features valued by commercial actors. 65 One such value is legal cer-
62. See, e.g., Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and
the Harmonization of the Laws of International Business Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J.
317, 326 (1984) (noting that lex mercatoria would provide a single harmonized body of law
to the business community).
63. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 43, art. 1-1(b).
64. Id. art. 6.
65. But see Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Definition of and Perspective Upon the Lex
Mercatoria Debate, in LEx MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 14 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed.,
1998) (arguing that international lawmaking cannot be evaluated solely by reference to
domestic law-making standards as a platitude in the domestic context may provide essential
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tainty: 66 contracts are an essential instrument of planning the future
of business relationships, and such planning requires a large measure
of legal certainty. 67 Commercial parties care about which law gov-
erns their contract because they want (and need) to know, in advance,
whether their contractual provisions are enforceable (or likely to be
enforced) under that law and, in the absence of a specific contract
provision, what default rules that law would apply.
An argument can be made that the CISG might not compare
with national laws in this regard. In a seminal article, Clayton Gil-
lette and Robert Scott argued that the complicated international nego-
tiation of the CISG favored compromise and, therefore, resulted in
the adoption of vague rules. 68 They underscored that the CISG re-
flects a compromise among representatives of over fifty states com-
ing from all legal traditions, so that the resulting treaty would be ac-
ceptable to all of them. One method used to reach such compromises
was a heavy reliance on legal standards rather than specific rules. 69
In this respect, it is interesting to note that many parties to interna-
tional sales specifically exclude application of the CISG from the
possible sources of law for their contracts, 70 although this might be
for reasons other than its unsuitability to the needs of commercial ac-
tors. 71
A critical question for assessing whether lex mercatoria could
be a suitable alternative to national laws is, therefore, whether it af-
fords the necessary degree of legal certainty that commercial parties
require. The question has long been hotly debated.
4. How Precise is Lex Mercatoria?
Although the new lex mercatoria has gained wide recognition
guidance in an unstructured international setting).
66. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 63 LA. L. REv. 1009,
1058 (2002); John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48
WAYNE L. REv. 1387 (2003); Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Towards an Economic
Theory ofPrivate International Law, 25 AUSTR. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 15 (2000).
67. In the context of American corporate law, some argue that Delaware won the
corporate charter competition despite the indeterminacy of its law. I address this argument
below in the text accompanying notes 92-96.
68. Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales
Law, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 446 (2005).
69. Id. at 469.
70. John Coyle, Rethinking the Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REv. 343 (2011).
71. Lack of knowledge of the Convention by lawyers is certainly one such reason.
Another might be the lack of authoritative case law interpreting the instrument.
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in the last fifty years, a variety of scholars and practitioners have crit-
icized it. Such critiques have ranged from its conceptual impossibil-
ity72 to its ideological coloration. According to the latter critique, lex
mercatoria helped maintain the dominance of the West in interna-
tional trade73 and was designed to promote a doctrine of laissez-
faire.74 However, the most important and frequent critique has been
its overall lack of substance and the vagueness of those few new lex
mercatoria rules that could be identified.
From the outset, critics of lex mercatoria have underscored its
lack of comprehensiveness.75 On many issues, it seems virtually im-
possible to identify any rule or principle that adjudicators could use
to settle a dispute. At first glance, this might come as a surprise, giv-
en the numerous sets of norms that its proponents consider to be le-
gitimate sources of the new lex mercatoria. In truth, however, those
sources very rarely offer a comprehensive regime. There are, of
course, noticeable exceptions, such as the CISG for international
sales and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its produced by the International Chamber of Commerce. But, for
most contracts, the law has simply not been sufficiently harmonized
at the international level, and experience has shown that there are, in
fact, no commercial customs either. Rather, adjudicators seeking in-
ternational norms are left with a few general principles previously
identified by arbitral tribunals. For several decades, those norms in-
cluded twenty- to thirty-odd principles. While that figure may have
increased recently, it still cannot compare with most national laws,
which offer hundreds of rules.
Further, lex mercatoria's critics have long insisted that its
rules, to the extent they can be identified, lack precision. 76 Again, it
72. See, e.g., Paul Lagarde, Approche Critique de la Lex Mercatoria, in LE DROIT DES
RELATIONS COMMERCIALES INTERNATIONALES-ETUDES OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN
125 (Philippe Fouchard, Philippe Kahn & Antoine Lyon Caen eds., 1982).
73. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 90
(1996); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 898 (Jan Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012).
74. Mustill, supra note 42, at 116-17.
75. 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2236 (2009); JEAN-
FRANCOIS POUDRET & StBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARE DE L'ARBITRAGE 697 (2002);
FILIPDELY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEXMERCATORIA j 501 (1992).
76. BORN, supra note 75, at 2236; POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 75, at 697;
Charalambos Pamboukis, Lex Mercatoria Reconsidre, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt:
ESPRIT ET MtTHODES-MtLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PAUL LAGARDE 646, 657 (2005); Keith
Highet, The Enigma ofLex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989).
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is useful to distinguish those few fields where the law has been har-
monized internationally from others. The CISG, for example, offers
a set of reasonably precise rules that are, from that perspective, com-
parable to the commercial laws of many States. Likewise, the Uni-
form Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits published by
the ICC offers a set of precise rules that are regularly revised. But
for most types of contracts, the accepted sources of lex mercatoria
will have no specific rules to offer, such that parties and arbitrators
will have to resort to general principles of international commerce as
recognized by international tribunals. Thus, the actual "rules" of lex
mercatoria will only be general principles, which give an immediate
indication of their precision. Moreover, those principles are indeed
often very general. A striking example thereof is the principle that
"contracting parties must act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing." 77
An interesting response to these critiques was made by one of
today's leading advocates of lex mercatoria, professor and arbitrator
Emmanuel Gaillard. As previously noted, Gaillard proposed a new
approach whereby lex mercatoria is to be considered as a method of
decision-making rather than a mere list of rules. 78 According to Gail-
lard, seeing lex mercatoria as a method solves the issue of its lack of
precision and vagueness, because one or more of the to-be compared
national laws would have rules addressing all potential legal issues
arising in the dispute. 79 By comparing their solutions, adjudicators
would be able to come up with a precise solution to any disputed is-
sue. The method proposed by Gaillard may or may not, in fact, pro-
vide international arbitrators with a tool improving their capacity to
decide disputes on the basis of lex mercatoria. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that such a method gives a great deal of flexibility and
discretion to adjudicators, making it equally clear that parties could
never hope to predict with any reasonable degree of certainty the re-
sult arbitrators would reach when implementing it. One is, therefore,
hard-pressed to imagine how this new concept of lex mercatoria
could possibly improve the contracting parties' ability to assess, ex
ante, what their obligations are under a contract they made subject,
wisely or not, to lex mercatoria.
Regardless of whether one understands lex mercatoria as a
list of rules or as a method of decision-making, the conclusion seems
straightforward: the new lex mercatoria does not offer rules of deci-
77. See BERGER, supra note 45, at 377.
78. Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
79. Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria, supra note 53, at 226.
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sion that can be compared to national laws in terms of precision or
comprehensiveness. If the true benefit parties can (and should) ex-
pect from the law governing their contract is precise default rules that
enable them to reasonably assess their future obligations under that
contract, lex mercatoria seems, at best, woefully inadequate. As the
purposes of establishing lex mercatoria as a separate and distinct
commercial law cannot be met if it is defined as a decision-making
method, the only remaining question, then, is whether lex mercatoria
as a list of rules-that is, the new "codified" lex mercatoria-can
one day achieve the goal of precision and legal certainty well enough
to be considered satisfactory by commercial actors.
5. Is Lex Mercatoria Otherwise Beneficial for Commercial Parties?
While it is doubtful that lex mercatoria genuinely reduces
transaction costs in international contract negotiations, it might bring
other benefits to commercial parties that could justify choosing it as
the governing law in a contract. Indeed, most lex mercatoria advo-
cates base the need for its further development on other arguments.
However, such arguments are equally unconvincing.
6. Unpredictable Choice of Law Rules
The most common argument in support of the usefulness of
lex mercatoria suggests that commercial parties should prefer lex
mercatoria to a national law because of the uncertainties generated
by the conflict of laws,80 since commercial parties need legal certain-
ty, a proposition which can hardly be challenged. Obviously, in any
international dispute, the applicable law must be determined. This
process, it is argued, creates uncertainty for the parties: modern
choice of law rules have simply become too complex to accurately
predict which law will govern the contract.81 Thus, lex mercatoria's
proponents argue, the only way to offer legal certainty to internation-
al commercial actors is to enable them to avoid the choice of law
process by making a uniform law available.
There is no doubt that modern choice of law rules have be-
come incredibly complex, both in Europe and in the United States,
and that this has resulted in less predictability. There are, however,
exceptions: one is the choice of law rule in contractual matters. Par-
ties are free to choose the law governing their contract. The rule is
80. BERGER, supra note 45, at 9; Stone Sweet, supra note 55, at 631.
81. See supra note 80.
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clear and simple, and such choice of law clauses are generally en-
forced in most jurisdictions around the world. 82 This is even truer
when parties choose arbitration rather than litigation. Of course, par-
ties to international contracts may fail to specify the applicable law in
advance. In such cases, a default choice of law rule would apply, and
it would typically be complex and rather unpredictable. But would
parties who have otherwise failed to include a choice of law clause in
their contract really care about legal certainty? Most of them would
probably be unsophisticated from a legal point of view, and would
neither be ready to invest resources in assessing which law governs
their contract, nor benefit from any uniform law. 83 Conversely, le-
gally sophisticated parties, in most cases, specify the law governing
their contract therein, such that, in the event of a dispute thereunder,
the choice of law process will not cause any significant problem, let
alone create any uncertainty. 84
Furthermore, while the argument that applying a uniform law
offers more legal certainty than applying a national law makes some
sense if it incorporates a developed body of rules, it borders on ludi-
crous in the context of a uniform law composed of vague principles
coupled with a complex comparative methodology for identifying po-
tential rules of decision.85
7. Need for Rules Specifically Tailored for International
Transactions
Another argument in favor of lex mercatoria suggests that its
rules are uniquely adapted to international transactions, such that,
when combined with a contractual stipulation that it applies, it avoids
domestic rules which are unfit for such purposes. 86
There is no doubt that some of the norms typically considered
to be part of lex mercatoria are specifically tailored to some particu-
lar transactions. Model contracts developed by trade associations
have been specifically designed for a particular industry and/or a par-
ticular type of transaction, and one trusts that they include clauses
which are both more specific and better adapted to their object than
the general default rules of national contract law. Similarly, in those
82. South America might be a noticeable exception. See Coyle, supra note 70, at 364.
83. On the concept of legal sophistication, see the text accompanying notes 56-57.
84. Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria-Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 67, 77 (2004).
85. Supra Part I.B.
86. See, e.g., Lando, supra note 42, at 748.
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industries where specific customs and usages have developed, one
trusts that they are better adapted and more specific than general
rules of national laws.
However, using such norms is not-and never was-limited
to cases in which lex mercatoria was chosen to govern a contract.
Rather, national laws also typically apply such norms because virtu-
ally all developed countries both recognize the freedom of contract
and allow the application of trade usages in dispute resolution. If a
trade association drafts a detailed model contract, its detailed norms
will be applied regardless of whether the parties chose lex mercatoria
or the national law of any sophisticated nation to govern their con-
tract.87
Lex mercatoria, moreover, encompasses many general norms,
such as international treaties and general principles of law.8 8 The
claim that these norms are somehow better adapted to international
trade than national law is weak.89 Although they sometimes inno-
vate, international commercial treaties typically adopt rules that al-
ready exist in national legal systems, and by definition general prin-
ciples of the law are based on norms commonly found in national
legal systems. In that regard, Celia Wasserstein Fassberg stated that
she had not been able to identify a single rule unique to lex mercato-
ria;90 rather, the origin of all its general rules is national law.9 1
8. Highly-Skilled Adjudicators Suffice
One last argument could be made in support of lex mercato-
ria: its quality is not critical for commercial actors because the quali-
ty of the applicable law is not what really matters to them. Rather, so
the argument goes, their critical concern is the quality of the adjudi-
cators-they want great adjudicators-such that they are more than
willing to rely on the adjudicators' expertise and wisdom instead of
precise, efficient, and predictable rules of law.
A version of this argument has long been made in the context
of the corporate charter competition debate in the United States.
American corporate law is dominated by Delaware; more than half of
publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated
87. Indeed, as underscored in Part II, trade associations will often include in their
model contracts a choice of law clause providing for the application of a national law.
88. Supra Part II.
89. See Fassberg, supra note 84, at 79.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 80.
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therein. Under U.S. conflict of laws, that incorporation is enough to
trigger the application of Delaware corporate law to internal corpo-
rate issues, meaning that parties choose Delaware corporate law
simply by incorporating in Delaware. One might, therefore, assume
that Delaware built its success on detailed and precise corporate law
rules. Many corporate law scholars indeed believe that the "greatest
benefit that Delaware offers corporations is a highly developed case
law that provides not only a useful set of precedents, but also a sub-
stantial degree of certainty about legal outcomes." 92 Other corporate
law scholars, however, reject that glowing description of Delaware
corporate law, arguing instead that Delaware corporate law relies on
many vague standards that make it difficult to predict legal out-
comes. 93 While recognizing that such indeterminacy is costly for
economic actors, 94 those scholars offer other theories to explain why
companies continue to incorporate in Delaware: first and foremost
among them is that Delaware has an illustrious, specialized equity
court, its constitutionally-created Court of Chancery, 95 and that it is
the experience and quality of its chancellors and vice chancellors that
are the critical factors in Delaware's success in the corporate charter
race. 96
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to discuss
whether Delaware's success was achieved, notwithstanding the inde-
92. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 484 (1987); see also Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. EcON. & ORG.
225, 280 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554
(2002).
93. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1910 (1998).
94. Id. at 1947.
95. Del. Const. art. VI, § 14 (1797) ("The equity jurisdiction heretofore exercised by
the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, shall be separated from the common law
jurisdiction, and vested in a Chancellor, who shall hold Courts of Chancery in the several
counties of this State."); see also Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DELAWARE
STATE COURTS, http://www.courts.delaware.gov/Chancery/judges.stm (last visited Jan. 8,
2013) ("The Court of Chancery consists of one chancellor and four vice chancellors ...
nominated by the Governor and must be confirmed by the Senate for 12-year terms. The
Delaware Court of Chancery is a non-jury trial court that serves as Delaware's court of
original and exclusive equity jurisdiction, and adjudicates a wide variety of cases involving
trusts, real property, guardianships, civil rights, and commercial litigation. The chancellor
and vice chancellors must be learned in the law and must be Delaware citizens.") (emphasis
added).
96. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 92, at 276; Kamar, supra note 93, at 1925.
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terminacy of its substantive corporate law, because of the quality of
its Court of Chancery. It is quite clear, however, that even if it could
be demonstrated that commercial actors are ready to trade precise le-
gal rules for skilled and knowledgeable adjudicators, it cannot ex-
plain why commercial actors would choose lex mercatoria as the law
governing their transactions. There is a fundamental difference be-
tween litigating in Delaware's Court of Chancery and going to inter-
national arbitration. Delaware's chancellors and vice chancellors are
known and respected. In sharp contrast, arbitrators are not known
before an actual dispute arises, and the most widely used appoint-
ment mechanism makes it virtually impossible to predict who most of
them will be. A given party will only have the chance to freely ap-
point one arbitrator, with the second freely appointed by the other
party and, finally, the president of the tribunal typically chosen by the
two party-appointed arbitrators. It may be that the arbitral tribunal is
composed of experienced commercial lawyers; on the other hand, un-
less otherwise stipulated in advance, there is no requirement that the
arbitrators be experienced, or even attorneys. While a credible argu-
ment can be made that American companies value the quality of Del-
aware's Court of Chancery so much that they are willing to risk legal
uncertainty, that same argument cannot be made in the context of in-
ternational arbitration.
B. An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Lex Mercatoria by
Commercial Actors
1. Methodology
Conducting an empirical study of the contractual practices of
international commercial actors with regard to lex mercatoria raises
certain methodological issues. Data is hard to collect for several rea-
sons: most importantly, most international commercial contracts are
not typically made public and are frequently subject to confidentiality
provisions, prohibiting even the disclosure of their existence. In
some very special circumstances, national law may compel certain
persons to publish some of their contracts, but these contracts could,
at best, help to understand the practices of the parties subjected to
such an obligation. For instance, U.S. law requires that publicly
traded companies publish certain types of contracts. 97
97. One such example is the obligation to file Form 8K to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. For an empirical analysis of contracts published as a consequence of this
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A second difficulty in collecting empirical data on the use of
lex mercatoria is that when disputes arise out of contracts providing
for the application of lex mercatoria, they will not typically be liti-
gated, but instead go to arbitration, and gathering data with respect to
arbitral practices or disputes going to arbitration is arduous. At the
outset, arbitral awards, being part of private dispute resolution pro-
ceedings, are not public like judicial awards are. Indeed, arbitration
proceedings are typically confidential. Furthermore, as arbitration is
a decentralized mode of dispute resolution, no one can seriously pre-
tend to be able to locate all arbitral awards or be aware of the exist-
ence of all arbitration proceedings. Moreover, contracts giving rise
to disputes are not necessarily representative of all concluded con-
tracts: disputes may arise out of certain contracts precisely because
of the clauses they contain, which may provide an incentive to the
parties to introduce proceedings. In such cases, it could thus be that
litigated contracts giving rise to disputes only represent contracts
containing inappropriate clauses and, hence, give rise to more dis-
putes than others.
That being said, some arbitral institutions regularly publish
data on some of the contractual practices of the parties referring cases
to them. In particular, the ICC publishes, every year, data on the
choice of law practices of the parties referring cases to its Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration (ICC Court) in its ICC International Court
of Arbitration Bulletin (ICC Data). This Article will argue that ICC
Data is meaningful for the purpose of empirically studying the con-
tractual practices of international commercial parties with respect to
lex mercatoria. The ICC is the leading arbitral institution in the
world for settling international commercial disputes. 98 Although it
only receives 600 to 800 requests for arbitration per year, it handles
more international commercial arbitrations than any other institution
in the world. 99 Those referred cases involve all industries and the
origin of the parties is remarkably diverse, although it seems that Eu-
obligation, see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1975 (2006).
98. Of course, the data would have been more representative if I had been able to
include statistics of other important arbitral institutions, but other institutions do not publish
similar data. I contacted some of them (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, London Court
of International Arbitration), but they declined to provide similar data to me. The most
likely reason is that these institutions have simply not collected it.
99. Surveys have revealed that it is the preferred institution of the majority of parties.
See, e.g., WHITE & CASE, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (2010) (stating corporations prefer the ICC 50% of the
time).
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ropean parties dominate. 00 While it would be useful to have access
to the millions of international commercial contracts concluded each
year, as well as the resources to analyze all of them, that will not
happen any time soon, if ever. Thus, in the meantime, no one is able
to offer a more accurate description of international contractual prac-
tices than the ICC. It is noteworthy that the ICC Data has remained
remarkably stable over the years, which again suggests that such data
is, in fact, representative.
Of course, the ICC Data only covers contracts that gave rise
to a dispute. There is, therefore, a possibility that the contractual
practices revealed by the ICC Data are only those of parties who will
eventually seek a binding resolution to their dispute. If a given prac-
tice provides an incentive to seek external dispute resolution, it could
be that it is overrepresented in the data collected by a dispute resolu-
tion center, such as the ICC. As the topic under discussion here is the
contractual practice of choosing lex mercatoria to govern the parties'
contract, one could certainly argue that choosing to apply lex merca-
toria in an international contract might prove to be just such an in-
centive: a reasonable argument can be made that because the solu-
tions offered by lex mercatoria are far less precise and certain than
solutions offered by many national laws, the parties are far less able
to predict how an arbitral tribunal would rule on the basis of lex mer-
catoria, making them more likely to believe they have a chance to
prevail in an arbitration. With such a belief, it is much easier to opt
for arbitration rather than some other form of dispute resolution. In
other words, it should be kept in mind that contracts providing for the
application of lex mercatoria might actually be overrepresented in
the ICC Data.
2. The ICC Data
For purposes of this Article, I have reviewed the ICC Data
published for the years 1999 through 2012.101 During those fourteen
years, 8,911 requests for arbitration were filed with the ICC Court.
100. The ICC reports that parties came from 137 countries in 2012, 139 in 2011, 140 in
2010, 128 in 2009, 120 in 2008, 126 in 2007, and 125 in 2006.
101. The data is reported in the statistical reports published each year in the ICC
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin. The statistical report for each year is published
in the bulletin's first edition in the following year; i.e., the statistical report for 1999 is
contained in the first edition of the 2000 bulletin. For the most recently cited data in this
paper, from 2012, see the 2012 Statistical Report in the ICC INT'L CT. of ARB. BULL. Vol.
24/Number 1-Issue 1, 2013. All references to data from specific years refer to the bulletins
published the next year.
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In compiling the ICC Data, the ICC looks at the underlying contract
in each dispute. Over a period of fourteen years, the ICC Data, there-
fore, reveals the contractual practices followed in 8,911 instances.
On the most important points, the ICC Data is remarkably
consistent over the years. First, parties chose the law governing their
contract in 80-85% of the cases. Second, when they made a choice,
they almost always chose a national law; on average, non-national
rules were chosen in only 1-2% of the cases. Third, no single na-
tional law dominated, although both English law and Swiss law were
chosen more often than other national laws (i.e., each in more than
10% of the cases).
For this discussion, the most important figure is obviously
that less than 2% of the parties that had referred cases to the ICC
Court intentionally chose non-national rules to govern their contract;
more precisely, over that eleven-year period, only 148 contracts re-
viewed by the ICC contained such clauses. Given that the ICC re-
viewed a total of 8,911 contracts, this means that only in 1.7% of
these contracts did parties opt to apply non-national law. That is not
much. But, there are valid reasons to believe that this tiny fraction
might overstate the number of contracts that select non-national law.
As already pointed out, such clauses arguably provide an incentive to
seek external dispute resolution, such that contracts representing such
a choice are statistically overrepresented in data collected by dispute
resolution institutions. In addition, parties providing for arbitration
as a mode of external dispute resolution are arguably sophisticated
parties, and are thus more likely to be aware that it is possible to sub-
ject their contracts to non-national rules. 102
Furthermore, the ICC defines non-national rules to include
the CISG when the parties specifically choose it to govern. Notably,
the CISG was chosen as the governing law in about half of those 148
cases in which "non-national rules" were deemed to have been cho-
102. In all fairness, one should not make assumptions about the significance of the data
without trying to explain why 15-20% of parties remain silent on the law governing their
contract. There is no way to know why they do so, however. Suffice it to say that, in the
absence of a choice by the parties, Article 21 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration and ADR
Rules gives the arbitral tribunal complete discretion to apply "the rules of law which it
determines to be appropriate." It is, therefore, impossible to know-in advance-which
rules of decision the tribunal will ultimately apply, such that parties who do not specify an
applicable law would be wrong to believe that the tribunal would automatically find a non-
national law appropriate. It is much more likely that most of them are, consciously or not,
ignoring the issue, perhaps because (1) they could not reach an agreement during contract
negotiations, (2) they found the cost of seriously addressing the issue too high, or (3) they
were legally unsophisticated and failed to see the importance of the choice, thus not making
one.
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sen by the parties. 0 3 Yet, the CISG is an international convention,
which is in force in over seventy states.104 It is not a private set of
rules different and autonomous from national legal systems, so one
can legitimately question whether parties specifically opting for its
application are genuinely selecting a non-national law. Indeed, had
they not expressly chosen it, the CISG might well have applied any-
way. 0 5 In other words, it can be argued that at least half of the cases
that the ICC Data presents as cases in which the parties chose to ap-
ply non-national rules to their contracts do not actually qualify.
What conclusions can be drawn from the fact that commercial
parties so rarely choose to apply non-national rules to their contracts?
There are two possible explanations. On the one hand, one might ar-
gue that many parties are simply unaware that they can choose non-
national rules as the law governing their contracts. But, such a lack
of party sophistication is hard to believe. First, the contracts underly-
ing the disputes referred to the ICC typically involve millions of dol-
lars.' 0 6 One can reasonably assume that lawyers were often involved
in the negotiation of such high-value contracts and that those lawyers
knew about the possibility of providing for the application of a non-
national law. Moreover, as previously noted, the parties were, by
definition, sophisticated enough to provide for ICC arbitration in
their contract. As they were aware of their ability to choose an alter-
native to national court litigation, it is more than likely that they also
were aware of their ability to choose an alternative to national law,
that is, to choose non-national rules. On the other hand, a more con-
vincing explanation is that the parties knew that they could subject
their contract to non-national rules, but that they consciously chose
not to do so. If they were going to choose a governing law, they
would typically choose a national law.
The ICC Data sometimes includes information about the kind
103. I present and discuss the ICC statistics on the different choices of non-national
rules below. See infra text accompanying notes 108-14.
104. The CISG has been adopted by eighty states, which include all major trading
nations, the United Kingdom and India being notable exceptions. CISG Database,
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/
countries/cntries.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2013).
105. Article 1-1(a) of the CISG provides that it applies automatically when the parties
have their place of business in different contracting states. United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 1-1(a), Jan. 1, 1988, 1849 U.N.T.S. 3.
106. Cases going to ICC arbitration rarely involve less than $200,000 (5.8% in 2012,
5.3% in 2011, 6.9% in 2010, 6% in 2009, 7% in 2008, and 11.3% in 2007). The value of the
disputes is between $200,000 and $1 million in less than one-fifth of the cases (19.1% in
2012, 17.5% in 2011, 17.9% in 2010, 16.4% in 2009, 20.7% in 2008, and 18% in 2007).
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of non-national rules that parties actually choose. Unfortunately, the
ICC gathered such information less rigorously and less consistently
over the years than it did for other portions of the ICC Data. Thus, in
some years, the ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin pro-
vides anecdotal reports that non-national rules of one type or another
were chosen in some contracts without giving precise figures, but in
other years, the same Bulletin gives the exact numbers of which non-
national rules were applied. Nevertheless, it is still possible to sum-
marize the provided data as follows:1 07 between 1999 and 2009, of
the parties referring disputes to the ICC Court who had expressly
chosen to apply non-national rules to their contracts, the preferred
choice was the CISG (often accounting for half of such choices), 08
while the other regular, but less frequent, choices included "general
principles of law," 109 public international law,1 0 "principles of equi-
ty, " 1 the UNIDROIT Principles,11 2 the ICC International Commer-
cial Terms (INCOTERMS), 113 and the law of the European Union
(E.U.). 114
107. The ICC Data is sometimes imprecise. While it provides the number of contracts
for which non-national rules were selected, it does not always provide the exact number of
contracts that provided for specific non-national rules such as "universally recognized
principles of law" or "public international law." Thus, in the footnotes below, there are
occasional notes that a contract "probably" chose a specific non-national rule.
108. In 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2012, half of the contracts providing for the application
of non-national rules chose the CISG. In 2008, it was the "predominant" choice of the
parties, and in 2010, it was chosen in seven of the ten contracts providing for non-national
rules. However, in 2003, it was chosen in only three of eight contracts providing for non-
national rules, in 2007 only one of three, and in 2011 only five of sixteen. In 2000, it was
only chosen in two contracts, while general principles of law and international business were
chosen in seven contracts.
109. "General principles of law" were chosen in one contract in 2004. "Private
international law" was probably chosen in one contract in 2011. "Universally recognized
principles of law" were probably chosen in one contract in 2008. "Principles of
international commercial law" were chosen in two contracts in 2004, in one in 2003 and
2005, and probably in one as well in 2006 and 2008. Remarkably, in 2000, it seems that
"[g]eneral principles of law and of international business law" were by far the preferred
choice of the parties, being used in seven out of nine contracts.
110. Public international law was chosen in one contract in 2003 and 2005, and
probably in one contract as well in 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2009.
111. Principles of equity were chosen in a few contracts in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2006,
and probably in one contract in 2005 and 2009.
112. The UNIDROIT Principles were chosen in one contract in 2002, and in a few
contracts in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012.
113. The ICC International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) were chosen in two
contracts in 2010 and in four contracts in 2011.
114. European legislation was directly chosen in one contract in 2003 and 2011, and in a
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In considering the reasons behind the particular choice, it
should be noted that at least some choices might have been dictated
by the particulars of the relevant contracts. For instance, the parties
might have provided for the application of public international law in
contracts involving a sovereign state, or they might have provided for
the application of E.U. law in contracts falling within the narrow
scope of E.U. legislation, which has harmonized the law of particular
kinds of commercial contracts. 115 As neither the underlying contracts
nor the arbitral awards eventually rendered in connection with the
dispute are made publicly available, however, it is impossible to con-
firm whether that is generally the case.
The ICC Data is, nevertheless, interesting insofar as it shows
that parties are ready to provide for the application of non-national
norms, which are very different in character.
The set of non-national rules most often chosen is the CISG,
which is significantly different from many of the other non-national
norms chosen in two crucial respects. First, the CISG can be fairly
presented as the international law of sales of goods: it is a rare ex-
ample of a successful attempt to unify the commercial laws of most
trading powers in one given field, the sale of goods. That means that
when parties negotiate an international sale contract, subjecting it to
international commercial law is a realistic option. Second, it makes
sense to choose the CISG because it offers a reasonably detailed set
of rules addressing most issues that can arise out of the performance
of an international sales contract. The CISG is as detailed as many
national laws governing the sale of goods, such that it offers compa-
rable legal certainty to each of the contract parties.
In sharp contrast, many of the other non-national norms cho-
sen by the parties are, at best, imprecise and, at worst, practically un-
identifiable. Parties often characterize such norms as "principles"
rather than "rules." When parties refer to the "principles of equity,"
for instance, it seems clear that they accept that their contract is not
governed by any precise rule at all.11 6 In the context of international
commercial arbitration, principles of equity are typically understood
to refer to the arbitrators' personal sense of right and wrong; such
few contracts in 2008 and 2009.
115. Commercial agency, for instance, has been harmonized by the EEC Directive of
Dec. 18, 1986 on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self
Employed Commercial Agents (86/653/EEC). In Award No. 9032 of 2001, 12 Int'l Comm.
Arb. 123 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.), the parties to a distributorship agreement, which were both
Europe based, had provided for the application of this directive.
116. Indeed, the word equity has been defined as "[t]he body of principles constituting
what is fair and right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (8th ed. 2004).
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principles depend on their personal preferences and background. By
definition, therefore, such principles cannot be identified in advance.
Similarly, references to "general principles of law" or "international
business law" are hardly easier to identify: they are typically under-
stood to be principles common to the laws of most countries or, at the
very least, large developed countries. 117 If such common principles
actually exist, which is far from certain, they are not easily identified.
Particular contract law rules can sometimes differ dramatically from
one jurisdiction to another and from one legal system to another, and
such differences legitimately cast doubts on the existence of any
common principle from which they could all derive. In any case,
whether such principles exist or not, there is no authoritative list of
them, and the process of identifying them is a major comparative law
effort." 8 Indeed, when scholars undertook the task of preparing re-
statements of international contract law (for instance, under the aegis
of UNIDROIT) it took them years to do so. 119 In other words, before
such international restatements existed and while they remained rela-
tively obscure, parties providing for the application of "general prin-
ciples of law" could not, and clearly did not, have any detailed set of
principles in mind, much less actual rules. Now that such restate-
ments exist, parties seeking legal certainty should specifically choose
the application of a given international restatement.120 Otherwise, if
parties continue to refer simply to general principles in their con-
tracts, it is clear evidence that legal certainty was not a major (or
even minor) concern.
For purposes of this Article, the ICC Data teaches a very im-
portant lesson: commercial parties rarely choose to subject their con-
tracts to lex mercatoria. It is chosen, most generously, in less than
2% of cases, and more accurately, in less than 1% (when internation-
al sales contracts in which parties subject their contracts to a specific
international treaty are excluded). It seems clear, therefore, that
commercial parties remain unconvinced that they actually benefit
from application of lex mercatoria. Given the vagueness of most of
its rules and its lack of comprehensiveness, their skepticism is hardly
surprising.121
117. See, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard, La distinction des principes gindraux du droit et des
usages du commerce international, in ETUDES OFFERTES A PIERRE BELLET 204 (1991).
118. There is, however, one unofficial collection of such principles, which may prove
influential in the future. See BERGER, supra note 45.
119. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
120. Choice of law clauses providing for the application of UNIDROIT Principles are
slowly increasing. See supra note 112.
121. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
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III. DRAHOZAL'S SIGNALING THEORY OF LEXMERCATORIA
Although its proponents have argued for fifty years that lex
mercatoria is beneficial for commercial parties, available data sug-
gests that the latter have voted with their feet and that there is still a
long way to go before they are convinced. As long as the content of
lex mercatoria remains so vague and/or complex, it is hard to see
how it can become more appealing to its alleged beneficiaries.
The logical consequence of international business people's
lack of interest should have been to limit discussions and debate on
lex mercatoria to academic circles. One can easily see why the
proposition of a transnational law autonomous from national legal
systems would attract a lot of attention from legal theorists. Conse-
quently, the significant interest by legal theorists should not surprise
anyone.122
What is surprising, however, is the interest lex mercatoria has
generated outside of academia. Many legal practitioners have also
engaged in the debate, and some have argued strongly in favor of lex
mercatoria.123 Arbitral institutions have also taken clear stands,
some going as far as encouraging parties not to provide for domestic
law in their contracts.124 Finally, some national courts have agreed to
enforce arbitral awards applying lex mercatoria, sometimes in cases
where parties had not expressly empowered arbitrators to apply it. 125
This raises the question of whether the favor bestowed upon lex mer-
catoria by non-party actors in the arbitral process can best be ex-
plained by the fact that they benefit more from lex mercatoria than
commercial parties.
In his article empirically studying the use of lex mercatoria
by commercial parties, Christopher R. Drahozal argues that the ex-
planation for practitioners' continuing interest in lex mercatoria can
122. The literature on lex mercatoria and the development of transnational law is
enormous. It is now also taking an interdisciplinary turn. See, e.g., BEYOND THE STATE:
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW (Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels eds., 2008); GRALF-PETER
CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010).
123. Two examples are Emmanuel Gaillard, who has proposed a new concept of lex
mercatoria, see supra note 53, and Fabio Bortolotti, who chairs ICC Task Forces promoting
lex mercatoria, see infra Part V.
124. See infra, Part V.
125. See, e.g., Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland SA c/ Primary, Cass. Civ.
lere, Oct. 22, 1991, J. DROIT INT'L 456 (1992) (Fr).
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be found in the market for international arbitration services. 126 He
suggests that people willing to be appointed as arbitrators need to
signal their quality to those who might appoint them. As arbitral
proceedings, and the resulting arbitral awards, are typically confiden-
tial, Drahozal concludes that publishing articles on international arbi-
tration issues is one of the few ways for prospective arbitrators to
signal their quality to potential clients. 127  He further argues that
those prospective arbitrators understand very well that they would be
better perceived by the market if they demonstrate their legal interna-
tionalism (i.e., their understanding of the diversity of different legal
traditions).128 Publicly participating in the debate on lex mercatoria
might well be persuasive evidence of such legal internationalism;
even though international commercial actors might not want their ar-
bitrators to actually decide their particular dispute pursuant to lex
mercatoria, those same parties might believe that a good internation-
al arbitrator should, at a minimum, understand the major differences
between legal traditions and the available rules of decision. For
them, an arbitrator should be a genuinely "international" or "trans-
national" lawyer. 129
I agree with Drahozal that many, if not most, publications on
international arbitration can be explained by the author's desire to
signal his or her qualifications as either a prospective arbitrator or a
prospective counsel in arbitration proceedings.130 I also agree with
his proposition that lex mercatoria is a good topic on which to write
for such purposes. Yet, the reason why it is such a good topic seems
to be that it is (a) fashionable in arbitration circles, and (b) perceived
as beneficial to the development of international arbitration.131 That
newcomers would grab on to a topic that is both fashionable and per-
ceived as going with the tide should not startle anyone: 132 in most, if
not all groups, junior members of the community are subject to cas-
cade effects.133 But, this cannot explain how lex mercatoria became
126. Drahozal, supra note 4, at 550.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 550-51.
130. BRUNO OPPETIT, THEORIE DE L'ARBITRAGE 10 (1998); Pierre Lalive, Sur une
< commercialisation )) de I'arbitrage international, in LIBER AMICORUM CLAUDE REYMOND:
AUTOUR DE L'ARBITRAGE 167, 171 (2004); JOSHUA D. H. KARTON, THE CULTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAw 60 (2013).
131. See KARTON,supra note 130, at 131.
132. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 73.
133. In the context of academic circles, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Academic Fads
and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1251 (2001).
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fashionable in the first place.
More importantly, Drahozal only tries to explain why people
have continued to write on lex mercatoria. Yet, although commercial
actors themselves remain cool to it, lex mercatoria exists outside of
books and articles: it is regularly used by arbitrators to decide com-
mercial disputes, most interestingly in cases in which the commercial
parties did not provide for its application.
IV. AN AGENCY THEORY OF LEXMERCATORIA
Aside from the parties, the most important actors in the arbi-
tral process are certainly the arbitrators. Most of the original writers
who advocated in favor of lex mercatoria were leading international
arbitrators, and they were the driving force behind its development.
Interestingly, most of those distinguished jurists were law professors
as well as leading practitioners. Thus, it could be that their interest in
lex mercatoria was only academic, such that they wrote on the topic
and promoted the concept out of an intellectual fascination with what
they saw as an emerging autonomous transnational legal order. Yet,
this paper queries whether, as international arbitrators, they did not
hope for more tangible benefits, apart from engaging in an interesting
intellectual debate.
In a study published in 1996, Yves Dezalay and Bryant G.
Garth argued that lex mercatoria was invented in the 1960s by a
handful of European continental arbitrators to give them total discre-
tion in deciding disputes between Western petroleum corporations
and newly independent Third World countries, and to eventually ad-
vance the interests of oil companies.134 These cases were not com-
mon commercial disputes, as they involved states. The issue of the
applicable law was, therefore, a delicate one, as states are generally
reluctant to be subjected to the law of another sovereign, and newly
independent states were even less willing to agree to the application
of the law of their former colonial powers. By providing for the ap-
plication of "general principles of international commerce," Dezalay
and Garth posited that such young states were able to claim inde-
pendence from the established legal regimes of colonial powers,
while the arbitrators were given complete discretion to decide the
dispute however they wanted. 135 For the authors, such discretion was
134. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 73.
135. Id.
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used to favor Western corporations.1 36 Dezalay and Garth concluded,
however, that those states eventually became critical of the conse-
quences of allowing arbitrators to rule under lex mercatoria, such
that the doctrine has gradually lost practical significance.137
A different story, however, is that lex mercatoria remains
popular with and still has many advocates among leading arbitration
practitioners. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lex mercatoria re-
mains appealing to a number of international arbitrators, who have
expressed their inclination to use it in cases in which the parties did
not even provide for its application.1 38 Some arbitration laws' 39 and
many arbitration rules' 40 empower international arbitrators to decide
disputes pursuant to non-national rules in cases where the parties
have not specified the applicable law.141 Thus, when the arbitration
is governed by such arbitration law and/or rules, arbitrators may de-
cide that the law applicable to the merits of the dispute will be lex
mercatoria. While it is very difficult to conduct empirical research
on the practices of international arbitrators, anonymous extracts of
arbitral awards are regularly published for scholarly purposes or
mentioned in publications by practitioners.1 42 This anecdotal evi-
136. Id. at 87 ("[Tlhis rather vague formula appeared to them sufficient to preserve the
interest of their clients and to assure them a margin of maneuver in case of conflict.").
137. Id.at9l.
138. See Gaillard, Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria, supra note 53, at 221; JULIAN LEW,
LOUKAs MISTELIS & STEFAN KROLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, 18-4 (2003); see also YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, GUIDE TO THE
ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 235 (2005) (stating that references by arbitrators to lex
mercatoria have been increasing).
139. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE, art. 1511 (Fr.); Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil
Code), art. 1054 (Neth.); BUNDESGESETZ OBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [Swiss
Federal Act on Law of Private International Law] Dec. 10, 1987, art. 187 (Switz.).
140. See, e.g., 2011 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, art. 17;
2009 American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules, art. 28; 2010
Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, art.
2; see also Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, art. 33.
141. Instead of requiring that the arbitral tribunal decide the dispute according to "the
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable," such laws and rules merely provide that
tribunals may apply any "rules of law" that they deem applicable. This difference of
language is unanimously understood as allowing them to choose lex mercatoria. See, e.g.,
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1444
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); LEW, MISTELIs & KROLL, supra note 138,
18-44.
142. As already underscored (see supra Part II.B), conducting empirical studies in the
field of international arbitration is particularly difficult, because arbitration proceedings are
typically confidential and decentralized. I have argued that the statistical reports published
by the ICC are the only exception (supra Part II.B). Unfortunately, the ICC only reports
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dence shows that international arbitrators have applied non-national
rules to decide the merits of disputes in a significant number of cases
where parties have not pre-selected the applicable law. In that re-
gard, I identified fifty-three such awards rendered in the last fifty
years.143 Interestingly, the vast majority of them (forty-seven out of
fifty-three), and virtually all such awards rendered over the last thirty
years, were delivered under the auspices of the ICC, 144 which may be
about the positive choices made by the parties when drafting their contracts. It does not
report about the decisions of arbitrators with respect to choice of law where the parties have
not provided for the applicable law.
143. 1 am grateful to Ms. Iuliana lancu for her assistance in this matter.
144. The forty-seven arbitral awards in which an ICC arbitral tribunal decided to apply
non-national law in the absence of a choice of the parties on applicable law were rendered
over a period of fifty years:
ICC Awards made in the 1960s (1): Award of 1969 in ICC Case No. 1641
(unpublished), cited in Horacio Grigera Na6n, Choice-of-Law Problems in International
Commercial Arbitration, 289 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 283 (2001).
ICC Awards made in the 1970s (9): Award of 1970 in ICC Case No. 1569
(unpublished), cited in FABRIZIO MARRELLA, LA NUOVA LEX MERCATORIA: PRINCIPI
UNIDROIT ED Usi DE1 CONTRATTI DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 340 (2003); Award of
1973 in ICC Case No. 1634, 100 J. DROIT INT'L (1973); Award of 1973 in ICC Case No.
1859 (unpublished), id. at 333; Award of 1972 in ICC Case No. 2103, Ill Y.B. CoMM. ARB.
(1978); Award of 1975 in ICC Case No. 2291, 103 JOURNAL DU DROIT DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 989 (1976); Award of 1975 in ICC Case No. 1434, 103 J. DROIT INT'L 982
(1976); Award of 1975 in ICC Case No. 2375, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS
(1974-1985) 257 (S. Jarvin & Y. Derains eds., 1990) [hereinafter I COLLECTION]; Pabalk
Ticaret Limited Sirketi [Co.] v. Norsolor S.A., Award of 1979 in ICC Case No. 3131, id. at
122; Award of 1979 in ICC Case No. 3267, 107 J. DROIT INT'L 962 (1980).
ICC Awards made in the 1980s (10): Award of 1980 in ICC Case No. 3540
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 245; Deutsche Schachtbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft
mbH (DST) et al. v. The Gov't. of the State of R'as Al Khaimah and The R'as Al Khaimah
Oil Co. (Rakoil); Award of 1981 in ICC Case No. 3344, 109 J. DROIT INT'L 978 (1982);
Award of 1982 in ICC Case No. 3572, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS (1986-
1990) 1154 (Y. Derains & J.-J. Amaldez eds., 1994) [hereinafter II COLLECTION]; Award of
1986 in ICC Case No. 4840, id. at 465; Award of 1988 in ICC Case No. 5466
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 234; Award of 1988 in ICC Case No. 5587
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, id. at 235; Primary Coal Inc. (U.S.A.) v. Compaiiia Valenciana
de Cementos Portland; Partial Award of 1988 in ICC Case No. 5953, 1990 REVUE DE
L'ARBITRAGE 701 (1990); Award of 1989 in ICC Case No. 5881 (unpublished), cited in
Na6n, supra, at 235; Award of 1989 in ICC Case No. 5713, in II COLLECTION, supra, at 223.
ICC Awards made in the 1990s (20): Award of 1991 in ICC Case No. 6786
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 294; Award of 1992 in ICC Case No. 5030, in
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS (1991-1995) 475 (J.-J. Arnaldez, Y. Derains & D.
Hascher eds., 1997) [hereinafter III COLLECTION]; Award of 1994 in ICC Case No. 7331,
cited in 122 J. DROIT INT'L 1001 (1995); Award of 1995 in ICC Case No. 7110, in 10 ICC
INT'L ARB. BULL. 40 (1999); Award of 1995 in ICC Case No. 8128, 123 J. DROIT INT'L 1024
(1996); Award of 1996 in ICC Case No. 8655, (unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 242;
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evidence either demonstrating the ICC's central role in developing
lex mercatoria, or simply that ICC awards are more widely publi-
cized than others.
The fact that some national arbitration laws or other arbitra-
tion rules authorize arbitrators to apply non-national rules when the
parties have not pre-selected an applicable law is telling. The current
norm in international commercial arbitration is to direct arbitrators to
apply a national law when the parties did not include a choice of law
clause; in that regard, the influential 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration instructs arbitrators to apply
a choice of law rule to determine the applicable law in such circum-
stances, implicitly forcing them to apply a national law.14 5 Likewise,
virtually all arbitration laws and rules in the world expressly forbid
arbitrators from deciding ex aequo et bono in the absence of a clear
choice by the parties empowering them to do so. 14 6 Yet, notwith-
standing that norm, a few national lawmakers, 14 7 and numerous arbi-
Award of 1996 in ICC Case No. 7077 (unpublished), id. at 283; Partial Award of 1996 in
ICC Case No. 7375 (unpublished), id. at 290; Second Partial Award of 1996 & Third Partial
Award of 1998 in ICC Case No. 7472 (unpublished), id. at 239; Award in ICC Case No.
8501, in COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS (2001-2007) 528 (J.-J. Arnaldez, Y.
Derains & D. Hascher eds., 2009); Award of 1996 in ICC Case No. 8502, 10.2 INT'L COMM.
ARB. 72 (1999); Award of 1996 in ICC Case No. 8503, id. at 419; Award of 1997 in ICC
Case No. 7304 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 285; Award of 1997 in ICC Case No.
8817, Agent (Spain) v. Principal (Denmark), XXV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 355 (2000); Award of
1998 in ICC Case No. 9427 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra, at 286; Award of 1998 in
ICC Case No. 9117 (unpublished), cited in MARRELLA, supra, at 457; Award of 1998 in ICC
Case No. 9419, 10 INT'L COMM. ARB. 107 (1999); Award of 1999 in ICC Case No. 9479, 12
INT'L COMM. ARB. 71 (2001); Award of 1999 in ICC Case No. 9455 (unpublished), cited in
MARRELLA, supra, at 350; Award of 1999 in ICC Case No. 9875 (unpublished), cited in
Na6n, supra, at 237.
ICC Awards made in the 2000s (8): Interim Award on Preliminary Issues of 2001 in
ICC Case No. 11061 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, id. at 266; Partial Award of 2001 in ICC
Case No. 9914 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, id. at 237; Award of 2001 in ICC Case No.
10422 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, id. at 235; Award of 2001 in ICC Case No. 10076
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, id. at 242; Award of 2002 in ICC Case No. 11018
(unpublished), quoted in Emmanuel Jolivet, L'harmonisation du droit OHADA des contrats:
l'influence des Principes d'UNIDROIT en matidre de pratique contractuelle et d'arbitrage,
13 UNIF. L. REv. 127, 143 n.39 (2008); Award of 2003 in ICC Case No. 11265
(unpublished), quoted in id. at 143 n.38; Award of 2004 in ICC Case No. 13012, quoted in
id. at 137 n.29; Award in ICC Case No.13129, XXXIV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 230 (2009).
145. 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 28.
146. See, e.g., LEW, ET AL., supra note 138, at 470 (stating that "[a]lmost all the laws
and rules which contain such authority are in similar terms").
147. Supra note 139.
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tration institutions1 48 have adopted a very liberal rule allowing arbi-
trators to apply non-national rules in cases where parties have other-
wise remained silent. It is hard to believe that this result could have
been achieved without a strong lobbying effort by influential actors
in the arbitral community. As one would expect, the first such liberal
rules were successfully adopted in arbitration institutions, which are
dominated by arbitration practitioners. One can only assume that
similar lobbying efforts may have induced other departments of the
same institutions to incorporate into their model contract clauses
providing for the application of non-national rules. 149
It seems clear that at least some actors in the arbitral process
have professional, rather than academic, incentives to support lex
mercatoria as an alternative to national law and to encourage its ap-
plication in arbitral proceedings. Below, I first explore what those
incentives might be for arbitrators and then consider whether an
agency conflict arises out of the relationship of those incentivized ar-
bitral actors to the parties to the dispute.
A. Assessing Incentives ofInternational Arbitrators
A useful starting point for assessing the potential benefits of
lex mercatoria for arbitrators is to ask how they would have per-
formed their task if that law did not exist. The answer is quite sim-
ple: they would have had to first determine the applicable national
law and then apply it. The critical question is, therefore, whether ar-
bitrators would be worse off if obligated to determine and apply na-
tional law instead of permitted to directly apply lex mercatoria. It
seems rather obvious that, at least in a few areas, they are worse off.
1. Lex Mercatoria Gives Increased Discretion
As already discussed, a first major difference between the na-
tional laws of developed nations and lex mercatoria is that those na-
tional laws are typically much more detailed than the general princi-
ples of lex mercatoria. In most instances, national law will offer a
precise rule of decision for the dispute. Thus, the decision-maker (be
it a judge or an arbitrator) will have limited discretion in the ultimate
resolution of the dispute. In sharp contrast, arbitrators deciding dis-
putes pursuant to lex mercatoria are only constrained by vague prin-
ciples and indeterminate sources: they have virtually unlimited dis-
148. Supra note 140.
149. See infra Part V.
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cretion to resolve the dispute however they see fit. 50 Indeed, some
well-known practitioners have argued that arbitrators ruling ex aequo
et bono or pursuant to lex mercatoria use similar (if not identical) de-
cision-making techniques.'15 Recall that Dezalay and Garth already
argued that, in the 1960s, lex mercatoria was invented by arbitrators
in order to legitimize resolving disputes in favor of Western oil com-
panies in disputes arising from State contracts. 152 Lex mercatoria's
use in commercial arbitration gives the same virtually boundless dis-
cretion to the arbitrators. While there is no evidence that current in-
ternational commercial arbitrators have any special agendas or wish
to favor certain classes of litigants, they might welcome broad discre-
tion for other reasons.
Arbitrating is a prestigious, and remunerative, activity. Can-
didates are bountiful. To stand out, some aggressively market them-
selves by, for example, writing for specialized journals and actively
participating in topical conferences.1 53 If they succeed in being ap-
pointed to a tribunal, they will generally want to be appointed to oth-
er tribunals.154 Hence, arbitrators (unlike national court judges obli-
gated to take any case that comes their way) have a clear incentive to
satisfy the actors who appoint them. Most arbitrators are appointed
by one party, who is most likely simply following the advice of his
lawyers. While virtually all arbitration regimes specifically impose a
duty of impartiality on the appointed arbitrators,' 55 every individual
arbitrator nevertheless has an obvious incentive to do his best to meet
whatever expectations the party who appointed him (and that party's
lawyers) might have. For that reason alone, no arbitral tribunal could
ever be composed of members appointed by just one party. Thus, in-
ternational arbitral tribunals are typically composed of two appointed
arbitrators (in a typical two-party dispute, one appointed by each of
150. See Pierre Mayer, The UNIDROIT Principles in Contemporary Contract Practice,
in ICC BULLETIN-SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS-REFLECTIONS ON THEIR USE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
111 (2002); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 39, 3-179 (2009).
151. See, e.g., Cremades & Plehn, supra note 62, at 332; Pryles, supra note 39, at 321.
152. Supra note 136 and accompanying text.
153. OPPETIT, supra note 130, at 10; Lalive, supra note 130, at 171.
154. While it seems clear that arbitrators wish to be appointed in other arbitrations, the
actual reason may vary a great deal. For some, it will be the prospect of receiving additional
fees. However, specialists of international arbitration also act as counsel, which typically
attracts more fees. See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 13 (1997).
Their incentive seems to be to maintain or to enhance their reputation.
155. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, § 33 (Eng.); UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, arts. 11-12 (1985).
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the disputants) and a president who is not appointed by either party.
The presence of that third impartial arbitrator normally makes it dif-
ficult for a party-appointed arbitrator to be overly zealous in promot-
ing the interests of the party who appointed him. 156
The president of the tribunal, however, is not immune to the
same professional incentive to ensure his continuing appointment to
tribunals. He will likely be an experienced arbitrator who has been a
party-appointed arbitrator many times. All members of the tribunal,
therefore, may share a common (if unspoken) understanding that no
party should be absolutely dissatisfied with the arbitral outcome, so
that no party-appointed arbitrator could be accused of inadequately
defending the interests of the party who appointed him. As a conse-
quence, all of the arbitrators involved might be willing to reach out-
comes that are satisfactory to both parties. To ensure the arbitrators'
ability to reach such mutually-satisfactory outcomes, the vaguer and
less constraining the applicable rules of decision are, the better it is.
The ability to apply lex mercatoria fills the bill nicely.
2. Avoiding "Foreign" Law
Another important reason why arbitrators may welcome the
broad discretion provided by lex mercatoria is that the alternative
might require them to apply the precise rules of an unfamiliar nation-
al law. The vast majority of international commercial arbitral tribu-
nals are composed of arbitrators who are not specialists in the appli-
cable national law, and who are often not even trained in that
particular law. At the outset it should be remembered that, unless the
underlying agreement to arbitrate so requires, the arbitrators need not
be lawyers. They may be technical experts, for example, engineers in
construction disputes. More importantly, international commercial
arbitration has been so successful because it offers neutral dispute
resolution. 5 7 Sophisticated parties prefer, all things being equal, to
156. See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, LOWENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
COLLECTED ESSAYS OVER THREE DECADES 101 (2005).
157. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM PARK & JAN
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION lxxvii (1997); LOWENFELD, supra
note 156, at 1; Pierre Lalive, On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and the Place of the
Arbitration, in Swiss ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 28 (1984). See also the
survey conducted by Christian Birhing-Uhle between November 1991 and June 1992, which
revealed that forum neutrality was considered one of the two most significant advantages of
international arbitration, together with higher prospects of enforcement internationally.
CHRISTIAN BGRHING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 109
(2nd ed. 2006).
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have the home court advantage-that is, they prefer to litigate any
dispute arising from such contracts in their home courts under their
own national law. Assuming both parties are equally sophisticated,
neither will risk giving the other such an advantage. Because failing
to address the issue in the contract could very well result in one party
grabbing the home court advantage by being the first to file suit, the
parties have little choice but to address it during the contract negotia-
tions; in that regard, they have few options other than a resort to
binding arbitration.158
The neutrality of international arbitral tribunals, of course, is
not a given; it depends on the composition of the tribunal. For that
reason, most tribunals are typically composed of jurists of different
nationalities and expertise, with parties typically appointing a mem-
ber of the tribunal who shares their nationality. The nationality of the
president of the tribunal, typically chosen by party agreement or by
the two party-appointed arbitrators, will most often be different from
that of the parties and the party-appointed arbitrators, in order to pre-
serve the neutrality of the tribunal.159 The result is that most interna-
tional arbitral tribunals are composed of three arbitrators of three dif-
ferent nationalities and, if they are lawyers, typically trained in three
different national laws. In the best case scenario, one tribunal mem-
ber will be familiar with the applicable national law, but in the worst
case, none will be.
In any case, many (if not most) international arbitration prac-
titioners argue that training in the applicable law is not a critical fac-
tor in appointing an arbitrator; 160 rather, they argue that what matters
most is choosing a reliable international dispute resolution expert.161
For leading arbitrators, then, virtually every dispute involves a need
to understand the complexities of a foreign law (i.e. a law in which
they were never trained and never practiced).1 62 With that recurring
158. Some go as far as to argue that it is their only option, and that consequently
arbitration actually enjoys a defacto monopoly over international commercial disputes. See
Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, STOCKHOLM INT. ARB. REv. 1, 2
(2008).
159. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 39, at 260, 4-60; Nathalie Voser and Pascale Gola,
in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 37
(Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Blaise Stucki eds., 2004).
160. Challenges of arbitrators on the ground that they were not knowledgeable in the
applicable substantive law have typically been rejected. See, e.g., DERAINS & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 138, at 160.
161. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 39, at 262, 14-65; Voser & Gola, supra note 159, at
37.
162. LEW ET AL., supra note 138, 18-2. Fabrizio la Spada, The Law Governing the
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burden in mind, it is quite clear, that if all such disputes were gov-
erned by a unique body of transnational rules, an arbitrator's life
would be much easier: it would, obviously, save them the trouble of
ascertaining the intricacies of an unfamiliar national law.1 63 But, it
would also allow them to avoid problems which might arise if one
member of the tribunal is well versed in the applicable law and could,
therefore, be accused of using his knowledge to the advantage of a
particular party.164 In such cases, rather than introducing an imbal-
ance in the tribunal, all three arbitrators may prefer to agree to apply
transnational rules, thereby putting them all on an equal footing.165
3. Enhancing Legitimacy
Ascertaining and properly applying the intricacies of a foreign
national law does more than just significantly complicate the interna-
tional tribunal's task. It also puts at risk its legitimacy, in particular
in the eyes of other actors in the arbitral process who might be spe-
cialists in the applicable law. Imagine an arbitral tribunal composed
of French, Swiss, and English arbitrators. If the applicable law is
English law, the parties may each hire English law firms to represent
them and add English barristers for the advocacy work. What would
be the legitimacy of an award, and of the tribunal that made it, if it
failed to grasp the complexities of the relevant English precedents,
neglected to take the factual background of the applicable authorities
seriously, or otherwise overgeneralized their meaning? 66 The par-
ties' English lawyers would certainly not be impressed, and although
the winner's lawyer might accept that such errors are a natural con-
sequence of using neutral international dispute resolution, the loser's
lawyer may well question the professional competence of those high-
ly regarded arbitrators or the appropriateness of choosing arbitration
in the first place. Further, if an opportunity to resist enforcement of
the award arises, he is much more likely to advise his clients to make
the best use of it, perhaps damaging the reputation of the individual
Merits of the Dispute and Awards ex Aequo et Bono, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN
SWITZERLAND: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 131 (Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler &
Blaise Stucki eds., 2004).
163. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 75, T 704.
164. Ole Lando, Assessing the Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in the Harmonization
ofArbitration Law, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 129, 140 (1995).
165. Id.
166. Civil lawyers might be tempted to do this. In the civil law tradition, case law is as
important a source of the law as in the common law tradition, but facts play virtually no role
in defining the scope of precedents.
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arbitrators as well as the arbitral process itself.
Those risks would evaporate if the arbitral tribunal could in-
stead apply vague (and otherwise poorly defined) transnational rules.
Although some of lex mercatoria's self-appointed guardians might
still disagree with the arbitral tribunal's ultimate reasoning, a tribu-
nal's use of such transnational rules allows it (and its members) to
avoid the possible embarrassment of being thought or publicly found
incompetent to apply complex rules of foreign law by leading spe-
cialists of the relevant legal system. One can, thus, understand why
international arbitrators would be inclined to apply an international
legal regime or try to denationalize applicable norms. 167 In cases
where a clear choice of the parties would not prevent them from do-
ing so (and the applicable arbitration regime would allow it), that
could mean ruling that lex mercatoria applies. But, even in cases in
which the parties specified the applicable national law, it would still
be possible to use lex mercatoria to mitigate the risks of improperly
applying that national law. Remarkably, international arbitral tribu-
nals often justify the decision both under the applicable national law
and some principle or rule of transnational law.168 By doing so, the
tribunal provides a preemptory response to any potential criticism of
its skill in applying the national law by confirming the decision's ap-
propriateness under international principles.169 Similarly, there are
examples of arbitral tribunals cumulatively applying several poten-
tially applicable substantive laws in order to enhance the legitimacy
of their decision. 7 0
International arbitrators may resort to transnational principles
to avoid venturing into unknown foreign laws. However, knowledge
of lex mercatoria and of transnational principles is becoming an ex-
pected competence for admission into the highest rank of internation-
167. See LEw ET AL., supra note 138, 18-4 (arguing that arbitrators should
internationalize, or denationalize, applicable norms and, when possible, prefer international
conventions over national laws).
168. See, e.g., Award in ICC Case No. 9651 (unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra note
144, at 262; Interim Award in ICC Case No. 5314, XX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 35 (1995); I
COLLECTION, supra note 144, at 197; Award in ICC Case No. 12112, XXXIV Y.B. COMM.
ARB. 76 (2009); see also Award in ICC Case No. 13129, XXXIV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 230
(2009) (applying international principles, but noting that English law would lead to the same
result).
169. Pamboukis, supra note 76, at 657.
170. See, e.g., Award in ICC Case No. 3540, I COLLECTION, supra note 144, at 105;
Award in ICC case No. 2272, II YB COMM. ARB. 151 (1977); see also Award in ICC case
No. 9651, supra note 168; Second Partial Award of 1996 in ICC Case No. 7472
(unpublished), cited in Na6n, supra note 144, at 239; Award in ICC Case No. 6618
(unpublished), id. at 263.
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al commercial arbitrators. In certain international arbitration circles,
international arbitration is viewed as fundamentally different from lit-
igation, such that arbitration should not in any way try to mimic do-
mestic dispute resolution. Rather, international arbitration should be
genuinely and distinctly international, and thus separate and autono-
mous from national law.17 1 For that reason, international arbitrators
should not "merely" be leading practitioners in one jurisdiction, but
should have an understanding of international business and the par-
ticular rules and customs applicable to it. They should, therefore,
demonstrate that their expertise is not only national, but transnation-
al,1 72 by showcasing their awareness of different legal traditions 73 as
well as their "legal internationalism." 174 As a consequence, mastery
of lex mercatoria becomes both a defining quality for international
arbitrators and a critical component of their legitimacy. From that
perspective, a decision-maker's lack of expertise in a particular na-
tional law is far less relevant than it would be in a national court set-
ting, especially if the tribunal's ultimate decision can be justified un-
der some transnational rule or principle. Moreover, this separate and
autonomous vision of international arbitration effectively excludes
potential competitors without the "necessary" transnational creden-
tials.
4. Reducing Accountability
The tribunal's ability to apply vague principles instead of pre-
cise national rules does more than simply increase the arbitrators'
discretion and make their lives easier; it also helps to preserve their
professional reputations. National commercial law is often complex
and subtle. Identifying and properly applying the correct national
rules can require a relatively sophisticated understanding of the par-
ticular legal system (e.g., how it works, the potential sources of its
rules, and the relative authority thereof). Arbitrators applying foreign
national laws have a significantly greater chance of making mistakes
than domestic adjudicators do. And, while errors of law would typi-
cally not jeopardize the validity or the enforceability of the resulting
award, they would hardly be good for the arbitrators' reputations.
171. KARTON,Ssupra note 130, at 138.
172. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 207 (student ed. 2003); Drahozal, supra note 4, at 550.
173. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bond, The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of
the ICC International Court ofArbitration, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 10 (1991); REDFERN
& HUNTER, supra note 172, at 207; Drahozal, supra note 4, at 550.
174. Bond, supra note 173.
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Although the decision and its underlying reasoning are not typically
made public, the parties and, more importantly, their lawyers, will be
well aware of the arbitrators' mistakes. Those lawyers are likely to
share their impressions of the arbitrators and their expertise with oth-
er members of the arbitral community when meeting at one of the
many conferences organized in the field. Most importantly, they are
highly unlikely to encourage others to appoint those same arbitrators.
Conversely, arbitrators applying vague principles and unclear meth-
odologies take far fewer risks. Indeed, with almost unlimited discre-
tion, it is extremely unlikely that the arbitral decision could be proven
simply wrong. Analysts might disagree with it or its reasoning, but
no one could actually establish that the arbitrators misunderstood the
applicable rules or misapplied them.
B. International Arbitrators as Agents
Lex mercatoria is not just an academic debate. As previously
shown, it provides international arbitrators concrete benefits. But, as
also shown, commercial parties do not appear to receive equal bene-
fits from its application. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis is that it de-
veloped, in spite of the lack of real benefits to commercial actors, be-
cause of those concrete benefits to international arbitrators.
Over a decade ago, in George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany
and Co.,' 7 5 Judge Frank Easterbrook first articulated the proposition
that the relationship between the parties and the arbitrators in an arbi-
tration proceeding was one of agency; the argument has since been
enthusiastically endorsed by academic writers. 17 6 Agency theory ad-
dresses situations in which one party (the principal) hires another (the
agent), who is typically more expert than the principal, to carry out a
given task. In the arbitration context, the disputing parties, being un-
able to resolve the dispute themselves, hire experts in dispute resolu-
tion (the arbitrators) to resolve the dispute for them. Thus, the arbi-
trator-party relationship falls squarely within the agency theory.
A problem in such a relationship arises when the agent has his
own interests in whether, or in what manner, the requested task is
performed. An agent might contradict the wishes of his principal to
pursue his own interest instead of his principal's. Agency theory
finds that such conflicts of interest should be resolved in favor of the
175. George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
176. Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review is Not Always
Pro-Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1013 (2010); Alec Stone Sweet, Arbitration and
Judicialization, 1 ORATI Socio-LEGAL SERIES (2011).
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principal, as it was he who hired the agent to perform the given task
for and on behalf of the principal. Of course, not every agent's
choice to pursue his interest results in a problem for his principal. An
agent may be able to fulfill his task in a variety of ways, and the
choice of which one may be completely irrelevant to the principal. In
that case, the principal should not care if, and indeed should expect
that, his agent chooses the method that both achieves his principal's
goal and best suits the agent's interests. An agency problem only
arises if the interests of the actors are not just different, but in con-
flict.
The arbitrator-party relationship fits well into the agency
model. The parties hire expert arbitrators to resolve their disputes.
The arbitrators' mission may be completed using different methods.
The parties should only be concerned about which method the arbi-
trators choose if the interests pursued by the arbitrators in making
that selection diverge from and conflict with the parties' interests.
By choosing to apply lex mercatoria instead of a national law to re-
solve the parties' dispute, arbitrators are arguably pursuing their own
interests, and not those of the parties, such that the "different" com-
ponent of a classic conflict of interest is present. But is there the req-
uisite "conflict" component, as well? It is important to assess the
scope of the problem before exploring which strategies could be used
to address it.
1. The Scope of the Problem
Principal-agent relationships only create agency problems
when an actual conflict of interests exists between the agent and
principal. I have argued that arbitrators have a variety of incentives
to choose lex mercatoria as the applicable law in absence of the par-
ties' choice to that effect. Some of them do not raise any issue be-
cause arbitrators can pursue those particular interests at no cost to the
parties. Others, however, create a genuine conflict of interest.
Logically, the most legitimate interest any agent can pursue is
to reduce the agent's cost of performance. Not only should the prin-
cipal expect the agent to pursue that goal, but it might actually bene-
fit the principal if lower agent costs result in lower fees to be paid to
the agent.' 7 7 Applying lex mercatoria, or any other international le-
177. The rules of some arbitral institutions (the London Court of International
Arbitration, for instance) provide that arbitrators charge the parties on an hourly basis. The
most commonly used practice, however, which is also the rule in many other arbitral
institutions such as the ICC, is that the fees of the arbitrators depend on the amount of the
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gal regime for that matter, offers the tribunal a tremendous advantage
by allowing the arbitrators to avoid first determining the applicable
national law, and then establishing its relevant content, particularly if
that national law is foreign to all or a majority of the members of the
tribunal.178 The tribunal's decision to apply or not apply an interna-
tional legal regime is neutral for the parties.179 Of course, if the con-
tent of lex mercatoria is equally, if not more, complex to assess, it is
not less costly for the arbitrators to resort to it. But that is also neu-
tral for the parties as long as the choice does not impact the fees
charged by the arbitrators. And, as noted below, available interna-
tional legal regimes can be easily applied at virtually no cost to the
parties.
In sharp contrast, increasing his discretion (and thereby
shielding him from claims of legal error) is an arbitrator interest
which comes at a real cost to the parties. My assumption is, again,
that commercial parties value legal certainty. They want to be able to
determine with precision what their rights and obligations are under
their contract. They want to know whether their contractual provi-
sions would be enforceable under the applicable law, and which de-
fault rules would apply in the absence of an express contractual pro-
vision. As lex mercatoria contains virtually no mandatory rules, 80
there is very little risk that arbitral tribunals would not enforce the
contract's terms. Most contracts, however, are incomplete, and un-
foreseen contingencies may only be resolved by applying default
rules. If the arbitrators decide to apply lex mercatoria, it makes it
virtually impossible for the parties to predict with reasonable certain-
ty which default rule might eventually be applied. When default
rules are clear, outcomes can be predicted and further dispute resolu-
tion costs seem wasteful. On the other hand, in an uncertain legal
environment each party can hope for the application of very different
default rules, such that the parties' interest in settling the dispute be-
fore the final decision is lower. Thus, the choice to apply lex merca-
dispute, and are thus unrelated to their actual work.
178. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
179. While the decision of arbitrators to use lex mercatoria instead of a national law to
decide the dispute would typically not impact the fees charged by the arbitrators, one could
easily imagine how it could impact the services of the lawyers of the parties and thus their
costs.
180. Some arbitration scholars have submitted that there could be a genuinely
transnational public order including a few rules such as the prohibition of corruption, racial
discrimination, or drug trafficking. See, e.g., Gaillard & Savage, supra note 141, 1 1535. In
practical terms, however, arbitrators virtually never use this transnational order. See id.
1533.
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toria results in higher dispute resolution costs for the parties.
I have also argued that international arbitrators may feel that
they increase their legitimacy if they decide disputes pursuant to lex
mercatoria. The issue of the legitimacy of international arbitrators is
not confined to the potential for agency conflicts of interest between
arbitrators and parties. The legitimacy of international arbitrators is
not only relevant to the arbitrators and the parties; rather, it is critical-
ly important to the community of international merchants and to in-
ternational trade in general. Arbitration is an essential tool for re-
solving international commercial disputes because it, alone, offers a
neutral dispute resolution forum. The parties' national courts can of-
fer no such alternative precisely because each party fears that the
other will enjoy an unfair advantage if the dispute is litigated in its
home court. Therefore, the success of international arbitration should
be considered an issue of general welfare because it is critical to in-
temational trade. Protecting and enhancing its legitimacy is central
to its continuing success. Thus, the need for legitimacy goes far be-
yond simply ensuring that parties respect and comply with arbitral
awards. Rather, because arbitration is contractual in nature and re-
quires agreement of the parties, if the arbitrators appear to lack legit-
imacy, parties might well abandon arbitration in favor of different,
more legitimate dispute resolution processes.
For that reason alone, the impact that applying lex mercatoria
has on the legitimacy of international arbitrators must be carefully as-
sessed. I have argued that one incentive arbitrators have to apply it is
to avoid using a national law they have not fully mastered. At first
glance, one might think that arbitrators who are not specialists in the
applicable national law should not try to hide that fact by choosing a
different set of rules or that parties should only appoint arbitrators
who possess the proper skill set. But that would be wrong. Interna-
tional arbitration achieves neutrality in dispute resolution by offering
the parties a chance to appoint arbitrators of different nationalities
and backgrounds, typically including a president who has no connec-
tion whatsoever to the parties or their dispute. That quest for neutral-
ity excludes a resort to only those decision-makers who are masters
of a particular national law. Because such neutrality is needed, any
arbitrator efforts to decide disputes on the basis of an international
legal regime, when otherwise appropriate, should be encouraged.
However, encouraging arbitrators to apply an inappropriate
international regime may well undermine the international arbitration
system. In particular, applying non-national rules that combine vir-
tually unlimited discretion with very limited accountability is more
likely to damage the legitimacy of international arbitrators than en-
hance it. While the appointment process provides a large measure of
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legitimacy to arbitrators, the decision-making method selected and
implemented by those arbitrators is, perhaps, even more important
for legitimacy. Specifically, to maintain legitimacy, arbitrators can-
not be perceived as acting without constraints or according to person-
al whim; instead, their decisions must appear to be derived from the
thoughtful application of established rules. Parties do not go to inter-
national arbitration to avoid the application of law; rather, they go to
international arbitration because it uniquely offers neutrality of adju-
dication. That is the very reason why virtually no arbitration laws al-
low arbitrators to decide ex aequo et bono without the parties' ex-
press grant of that authority. Rather, in the absence of such specific
party permission, they are bound to apply rules of law. The legitima-
cy of arbitral tribunals depends, therefore, on a general perception
that the decision was made pursuant to clear rules that different arbi-
trators would have also applied in the same circumstances. If parties
have not specified the applicable law for resolving their dispute, and
have not otherwise given the tribunal's arbitrators express authority
to rule ex aequo et bono, allowing arbitrators to decide pursuant to
lex mercatoria-that is, pursuant to a transnational legal regime
which provides virtually the same unlimited discretion and lack of
accountability without any need for express party permission-can
damage the legitimacy of international arbitration as an institution
and, thus, the general welfare of parties involved in international
trade.
2. Strategies
Using lex mercatoria may appear attractive to international
arbitrators for two distinct reasons: first, it is a transnational legal re-
gime that allows them to avoid applying a national law they may not
have fully mastered. Second, it incorporates many vague norms
which offer little, if any, limits on the arbitrators, thereby giving them
broad, if not unlimited, discretion. Thus, the very vagueness of lex
mercatoria raises a genuine agency issue if it is applied without the
parties' express consent. In contrast, the incentives of arbitrators to
apply other transnational legal regimes do not raise a similar prob-
lem. Quite to the contrary, issues that arbitrators address when re-
sorting to a transnational regime appear to be entirely legitimate and,
indeed, important not only for their own welfare but for international
commerce in general.
In light of such legitimate interests, the most obvious solution
to the potential agency problem-that is, an outright ban on the use
of any transnational legal regime in the absence of specific party au-
thorization-is not the most efficient. A better solution would be to
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ensure that, when arbitrators are called upon to decide a case in
which the parties have not selected an applicable law and have not
given them any special authorizations, those arbitrators are only per-
mitted to apply transnational rules that would be sufficiently precise
to limit their discretion.
Such transnational legal regimes exist as a result of the recent
efforts of scholars to produce international codes of contract law.181
Some such codes or sets of principles attempt to codify lex mercato-
ria and are based on actual customs, rules, and principles applied in
international commerce. Others are scholarly projects intended to be
international restatements of contract law. While they do not repre-
sent actual customs and rules observed by international merchants,
they are far more coherent, exhaustive, and detailed. One excellent
example of the latter is the UNIDROIT Principles, which are a co-
herent code of contract law affording precise and detailed rules. If
arbitrators were to apply such a legal regime when the parties did not
choose the applicable law, they would not have to apply a national
law, but their discretion would be appropriately restricted by precise
rules.182 Several arbitral awards have applied the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples as rules of decision and some have ruled that their use makes
lex mercatoria more precise and more foreseeable.183
As the foregoing discussion shows, the agency problem can
be addressed by restricting, in the relevant circumstances, the arbitra-
tors' choice to international codes of contract law or other detailed
codifications of the norms actually observed by merchants. The E.U.
Commission made such a proposal in 2006, though in a different con-
text. In 2005, the European lawmakers considered reforming Euro-
pean choice of law rules in contractual matters; in a first draft of a
new regulation, the European Commission proposed allowing E.U.
Member States to enforce contract clauses choosing "principles and
rules of the substantive law of contract recognized internationally or
in the Community" as the applicable law.184 The proposal only ad-
181. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
182. As the parties would not have agreed on the application of any particular legal
regime, the fact that the UNIDROIT Principles are not based on the norms actually observed
by international merchants and thus do not correspond to the initial concept of lex
mercatoria would be irrelevant: arbitrators would not have been instructed to apply lex
mercatoria or any similar regime.
183. See, e.g., Case No. 7110 of 1995, 10 ICC CT. BULL. 39 (1999); Case No. 12040 of
2003 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.); Case No. 11575 of 2003 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.); see also DERAINS &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 138, at 237.
184. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650, art. 3.
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dressed the power of national courts to apply non-state law, not the
power of arbitral tribunals to do so, which explains its modest reach:
it permitted parties to choose non-state law, but did not propose that
judges have the authority to choose, sua sponte, the applicable law.
Interestingly, even that rather modest proposal proved too innovative;
the E.U. Member States rejected it. In the arbitration context, how-
ever, the parties' power to apply a non-state law to their dispute is al-
ready widely accepted. What remains under discussion, though, is
whether arbitrators have (or should have) the right to apply non-state
law in the absence of a choice by the parties. Some arbitration laws
already grant arbitrators that right, while many others instruct arbitra-
tors to apply conflict of laws rules, and thus a national law. 85 My
proposal would, therefore, represent a compromise.
Agency theory offers a variety of strategies to address agency
problems and to protect principals. Regulatory strategies, on the one
hand, dictate substantive terms governing the content of the princi-
pal-agent relationship, which tend to impose direct constraints on the
agent. Governance strategies, on the other hand, facilitate the princi-
pals' control over the agent's behavior. Some strategies operate ex
ante, by proscribing certain behavior or by facilitating principal con-
trol before an agent acts, while others operate ex post (e.g., by re-
viewing an agent's actions after the fact).186
These strategies were developed in the context of corporate
law. While the arbitrator-party relationship can be analyzed from an
agency perspective, the two fundamental peculiarities related to the
international arbitrator's task must be taken into consideration to as-
sess which strategy might be appropriate. The first and most obvious
peculiarity is that arbitrators are hired by the parties to resolve a dis-
pute between the parties as adjudicators. As a consequence, they are
expected by the hiring parties to act independently from, and impar-
tially with respect to, both parties to the dispute, who both happen to
be their principals. So strategies for addressing agency problems in
the context of the arbitrator-party relationship must not negatively
impact the arbitrator's independent and impartial decision-making
process. Obviously, that restriction excludes a resort to widely-used
strategies in the corporate context, such as offering incentives to
agents to behave in a certain manner or granting to principals the
power to control, ex post, the agents' decisions.
185. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
186. For a useful survey, see John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Agency Problems and Legal Strategies and Enforcement, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed.
2009).
4232014]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
The second peculiarity of the arbitrator's task relates to the
essential reason parties choose to go to arbitration: the parties want
to avoid national courts because they fear that the national court of
the other party will be biased against them. As no international
commercial court yet exists, international arbitration offers them a
chance to limit, to the maximum extent possible, their exposure to
national courts while achieving a neutral decision-making forum. In
that regard, the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and
the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which is a cornerstone
of the international arbitration process, limits the involvement of na-
tional courts in arbitration proceedings to their final, albeit critical,
stage: enforcement of the arbitral awards. Consequently, to involve
national courts in any strategy purporting to address the agency prob-
lems raised by the arbitrator-party relationship would be problematic,
although the problem could be partially ameliorated if national courts
were only authorized to apply a mechanical rule subject to virtually
no discretion.
In light of the foregoing, an appropriate strategy might be to
follow a regulatory approach, adopting a rule that provides that
where parties did not specify the applicable law, arbitrators are au-
thorized to apply either a national law or an internationally-
recognized set of rules of contract law. Arbitral awards made in con-
travention of that rule could be set aside by the competent national
court. Such a rule would be straightforward and easily applied, and
would not confer on national courts any additional opportunity to re-
view the arbitral award on its merits.
The proposed rule, however, raises some issues. First of all,
the phrase "internationally-recognized set of rules of contract law" is
imprecise; to avoid that criticism, a better solution might be to ex-
pressly specify one or more particular sets of rules that can be used
(e.g., the UNIDROIT Principles or a particular international restate-
ment). Second, the power of arbitrators to apply lex mercatoria in
the absence of a positive choice made by the parties typically lies in
arbitration rules, as most national arbitration laws instruct arbitrators
in that situation to apply conflict of laws rules that, by definition, re-
sult in a national applicable law. To be effective, then, the proposed
rule would have to be either adopted by arbitral institutions or con-
sidered a mandatory rule of the applicable arbitration law.
V. A PRODUCTION COST THEORY OF LEXMERCATORIA
Over the last few decades, the ICC has been remarkably ac-
tive in promoting the use of lex mercatoria by international commer-
424 [52:369
LEX MERCA TORIA
cial parties. It is, of course, the home of the leading arbitral institu-
tion in the world, the ICC Court, but it also actively produces interna-
tional commercial norms, particularly model contracts. Below, I
show how, in each of these capacities, it has promoted the use of lex
mercatoria, and argue that it has done so to reduce its cost to produce
those model contracts.
A. The ICC's Efforts to Promote Lex Mercatoria
Most, if not all, international commercial actors have heard of
the ICC's INCOTERMS, which are widely used throughout the
world in international sales of goods. But that is not the limit of the
ICC's work in creating international commercial norms: one of its
most important activities is to produce international model contracts.
It has, for example, issued model sales contracts, 187 commercial
agency contracts,188 distributorship contracts, 189 and intermediary
contracts. 190 As all such model contracts are meant to be used in an
international context, the ICC could not possibly avoid addressing the
issue of the applicable law therein. Remarkably, the model contracts
typically include a choice of law clause that encourages the parties to
choose non-national rules to govern their relationship. The most
common model clause offers an option to the parties.191 The first al-
ternative offered, Alternative A, adopts a clause choosing, "in the
following order," among (1) "the rules and principles of law general-
ly recognized in international trade as applicable to international con-
tracts," (2) trade usages, and (3) the UNIDROIT Principles.1 92 The
second alternative, Alternative B, is a clause choosing a national law.
However, the drafters warn potential users that the model contracts
"were drafted under the assumption that [they] would not be gov-
187. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL
INTERNATIONAL SALE CONTRACT: MANUFACTURED GOODS INTENDED FOR RESALE (1997)
[hereinafter MODEL INTERNATIONAL SALE CONTRACT].
188. See generally INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL
COMMERCIAL AGENCY CONTRACT (2002) [hereinafter MODEL COMMERCIAL AGENCY
CONTRACT].
189. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP
CONTRACT (2002) [hereinafter MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT].
190. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC MODEL OCCASIONAL
INTERMEDIARY CONTRACT (2000).
191. See, e.g., id. art. 13.1; MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT, supra note 189, art.
24.1.A.
192. See, e.g., MODEL COMMERCIAL AGENCY CONTRACT, supra note 188, art. 24.1.A;
MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT, supra note 189, art. 24.1 .A.
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emed by a specific national law (as stated in Alternative A of [the
relevant article])" and they further explain that "[I]f the parties pre-
fer nevertheless to submit their agreement to a national law (by
choosing Alternative B), they should carefully check in advance if
the clauses of the model form conform with the provisions of the law
that they have chosen." 193 While it is true that some ICC model con-
tracts include very different choice of law clauses (e.g., the Model In-
ternational Sale Contract proposes the combined application of the
CISG and of a national law for issues not settled by the CISG),1 94 the
ICC still encourages the parties, in its introductory remarks to such
contracts, "not to choose a domestic law." 195
Whether the ICC's efforts to promote lex mercatoria through
its model contracts have been successful remains unclear. If they had
been successful, one would think that there would be far more in-
stances of arbitration in which the parties selected lex mercatoria to
apply. The fact that so few disputes referred to the ICC Court of Ar-
bitration including choice of law clauses applying non-state rules
suggests either that the model contracts are not widely used, or that
parties using them typically choose Alternative B, selecting a nation-
al law to govern their transaction.196 In any case, regardless of how
successful these contracts may be, they are unequivocal evidence of
the ICC's active promotion of the use of lex mercatoria.
That conclusion is further corroborated by some of the ICC's
choices as an arbitration institution. I have already noted that it has
been instrumental in advancing lex mercatoria as a set of rules to be
applied by international arbitrators. Specifically, the ICC Rules of
Arbitration allow arbitrators to apply "rules of law" both when the
parties provided so and when they have remained silent on the appli-
cable law.197 The ICC is not unique in this respect, however, as the
rules of all other international arbitral institutions give the same pow-
er to arbitral tribunals.19 8 On that basis, one might assume that all
major arbitral institutions are equally friendly to lex mercatoria, but
they are not. While the ICC encourages parties not to select an appli-
193. See, e.g., MODEL COMMERCIAL AGENCY CONTRACT, supra note 188, note to art.
24.1 .A; MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT, supra note 189, note to art. 24.1 .A.
194. MODEL INTERNATIONAL SALE CONTRACT, supra note 187, art. 1.2.
195. Stone Sweet, supra note 55, at 634.
196. A third possibility could be that they are widely included in actual contracts,
including Alternative A, but that disputes do not arise out of them.
197. 2011 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, art. 17.
198. See, e.g., 2009 American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules,
art. 28; 2010 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, art. 2; see also Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, art. 33 (2012).
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cable law in advance, many other institutions encourage parties to
choose a national law to govern their transaction. From a practical
point of view, that means that those other institutions encourage par-
ties to include a clause that excludes the arbitrators' power to apply
lex mercatoria.
All arbitral institutions have a suggested standard dispute res-
olution clause, which, in practice, plays a critically important role. It
is likely to be used by the vast majority of parties otherwise willing
to provide for institutional arbitration, if only because by using the
standard clause they exclude the risk of being held responsible for
not using it if things go wrong. Of course, the point of these standard
clauses is to provide for arbitration under the auspices of the relevant
institution. But many standard clauses also include, in addition to the
arbitration clause, a choice of law clause. And this choice of law
clause virtually always encourages the parties to choose the law of a
nation. The recommended clause of the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration, for instance, provides that "[t]he governing law of
the contract shall be the substantive law of []." 199 Similar model
clauses are also suggested by the Singapore International Arbitration
Center, 200 the German Institution of Arbitration, 201 and the Arbitra-
tion Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 202
The ICC (like some other arbitral institutions) does not in-
clude any choice of law provision in its standard arbitration clause. 203
Given that all of its model contracts include a choice of law provision
and that most of these provisions designate non-state rules, it is hard
to believe that the ICC inadvertently forgot to address such an im-
portant issue in that clause. Rather, it likely made a conscious choice
to exclude it,204 particularly as its arbitration rules address the power
199. See Recommended Clauses, LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute ResolutionServices/LCIA_RecommendedClauses.aspx (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012).
200. See Articles, SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, http://www.siac.
org.sg/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=66&Itemid=57 (last visited Nov.
8,2012).
201. See DIS-Rules, GERMAN INSTITUTION OF ARBITRATION, http://www.dis-arb.de/en/
16/rules/dis-arbitration-rules-98-idl0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
202. See STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.chamber.se/english-14.aspx
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
203. Other institutions which do not specifically encourage parties to choose the
applicable law include the American Arbitration Association (International Arbitration
Rules), the Swiss Chambers' Court of Arbitration and Mediation, and the Cairo Regional
Center for International Arbitration.
204. The ICC regularly revises its arbitration rules (most recently in 1998 and 2011) and
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of the arbitrators when there has been no law selected by the parties.
As many of its competitors include a choice of law clause that en-
courages the parties' advance selection of a national law, it seems
obvious that the ICC's silence amounts to a rejection of that solution.
The choice not to provide the applicable law in its standard arbitra-
tion clause is a way to preserve the application of lex mercatoria by
arbitral tribunals. The only remaining question is why the ICC does
not promote it more actively, as it does in its model contracts.
B. The ICC's Incentives to Promote Lex Mercatoria
Why would the ICC so actively promote the use of lex merca-
toria instead of taking the safer, and less controversial, route of en-
couraging parties to submit their transactions to a national law? It
could be for either of two reasons. First, advocates of lex mercatoria
may have effectively lobbied the ICC to take an active role in its
promotion: international arbitrators, who are logically very much in-
volved in the ICC's general functioning (particularly its arbitration
services), immediately come to mind for the reasons previously men-
tioned. 205 Alternatively, the ICC may have its own interest in pro-
moting lex mercatoria as a set of rules of decision.
The ICC has a patent interest in lex mercatoria's acceptance
and development in its role as a norm producer. Because it is a pri-
vate organization, it has no lawmaking power. It cannot pretend to
establish authoritative rules. Thus, if its norms are to be used, it must
be either because they are considered to be representative of trade us-
ages or because commercial parties voluntarily incorporate them into
their contracts. A few norms produced by the ICC have been so suc-
cessful that they have been recognized by national courts as trade us-
ages.206 Unfortunately, most of them never achieved that level of ac-
ceptance. Thus, the impact and success of ICC-generated norms
depend not just on the willingness of private parties to incorporate
them in their contracts, but also on the parties' power to do so.
The extent to which private parties are permitted to incorpo-
rate a set of norms in their contract depends on the extent to which
law curtails their freedom of contract. Most jurisdictions do not grant
could thus have revised its standard clause as well.
205. I discuss their incentives in the previous section.
206. For instance, U.S. Courts have given such status to INCOTERMS. See, e.g., BP Oil
Int'l v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos De Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003). French courts
have ruled likewise with respect to the Uniform Rules and Customs on Documentary Credit.
See, e.g., Cass. Com. 14 October 1981, Case No. 80-12336.
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parties absolute power to incorporate norms; certain mandatory rules
apply. Before one can incorporate norms into one's contract or, put
differently, use a model contract, one must first verify that the pro-
posed norms or clauses comport with those mandatory rules. Those
mandatory rules, however, vary from one jurisdiction to another,
meaning that, if an organization is willing to engage in the business
of producing norms or model contracts to be used in international
transactions, that organization should first verify that its product
comports with the more than 200 contract laws of all jurisdictions of
the world. Whether any organization has ever really done that re-
mains a mystery, but it is clear that some have sought legal opinions
as to the enforceability of the essential clauses of their models in a
number of jurisdictions. 207 A less costly option would be to incorpo-
rate a particular national law into the model or, at a minimum, advise
parties using the model to choose that particular national law, after
verifying that the model contract in fact comports with the mandatory
rules thereof.20 8 Of course, international commercial parties originat-
ing from other jurisdictions might be reluctant to simply choose the
particular law chosen by the model's drafters, especially if it happens
to be the law of the other contracting party, so such a model may not
be well received in the market.
From the ICC's standpoint, neither of these options is viable.
One can easily understand that attempting to verify whether a par-
ticular model contract (much less all of an organization's model con-
tracts) comports with over 200 contract laws is prohibitively expen-
sive, both in terms of time, money, and efficacy. The monetary costs
alone would be enormous. 209 Moreover, there would be no way to
assure that the laws of any one jurisdiction had not changed, requir-
ing an ongoing monitoring system to maintain the organization's as-
surance that its model complies with all national laws. That option is
simply a nonstarter.
The less costly alternative of imposing a particular national
law on the model contract is equally unpalatable. As an institution
based in Paris, the ICC might have been tempted to impose French
207. This is the case with ISDA, for instance, discussed supra Part I.A.
208. The Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), for instance, includes in its
model contracts a clause providing for the application of English law. This obviously
simplifies the job of verifying whether they are enforceable.
209. See Fabio Bortolotti, Reference to the UNIDROIT Principles in Contract Practice
and Model Contracts, in ICC BULLETIN, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 57 (2005) ("Were the contract to be submitted to an
indefinite number of domestic laws, chosen by parties in individual cases, it would be
impossible to draft clauses complying with all [rules of law applicable to it].").
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law, but its limited availability in English would certainly lead many
parties to pass on that choice of law and, perhaps, on the entire model
contract. Lex mercatoria, on the other hand, has several advantages.
First, being non-national, it is not the law of one of the parties; it is
thus unlikely to be perceived as favoring one. Second, lex mercato-
ria contains minimal (if any) mandatory rules, 210 thereby greatly
simplifying the drafters' task because they do not need to verify
whether their model comports with any particular contract law, let
alone all potentially applicable laws. As already noted, the typical
ICC model contract alerts potential users that it was drafted with the
assumption that parties would provide for the application of a non-
national legal regime, and warns parties deciding to submit their con-
tract to a national law to verify whether the model complies with the
mandatory rules of the chosen law.2 11
Fabio Bortolotti, an Italian academic and arbitrator who cur-
rently chairs the ICC's policy commission responsible for drafting
model contracts (Commercial Law and Practice Commission) and
formerly chaired the ICC task forces that drafted model contracts on
international agency, distributorship, franchising, and contracts with
occasional intermediaries, confirms the foregoing in various writings.
In an article presenting the new ICC Model Commercial Agency
Contract, Mr. Bortolotti explained why it provided for the application
of non-national law. 2 12 He suggested that principals would typically
want to use the same model contract for all their agents, irrespective
of the jurisdiction concerned. 2 13 In that regard, subjecting the model
contract to lex mercatoria has the unique advantage of situating it in
a "free space"-an "autonomous zone"-where national laws do
not apply. 214 The parties would, thus, be able to "subtract them-
selves from the application of domestic rules, even mandatory
ones. "215 The only limit would be public policy in the jurisdictions
in which the arbitral award needs to be recognized: an arbitral award
can always be denied recognition if it is contrary to public policy. 216
210. As already underscored, some arbitration scholars have submitted that there could
be a genuinely transnational public order, but this is virtually never relevant in practice. See
supra note 180.
211. Supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
212. Fabio Bortolotti, Vers une Nouvelle Lex Mercatoria de l'Agence Commerciale
Internationale? Le Moddle de Contrat d'Agence de la CCI, 1995 Iwr'L Bus. L.J. 685 (1995).
213. Id. at 688.
214. Id. at 688-89.
215. Id. at 689.
216. Id.
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Imposing, or strongly encouraging, the choice of lex mercato-
ria as a model contract's governing law might well have offered a so-
lution to the problem of mandatory rules contained in national con-
tract laws. It is certainly the most pressing problem faced by drafters
of international model contracts, but it is not the only one. Contract
provisions may be invalidated or otherwise held unenforceable pur-
suant to a variety of other national laws such as antitrust or insolven-
cy laws. No advocate of lex mercatoria has ever claimed that it
could displace such regimes. 217 It is, therefore, no antidote to their
application. Drafters of international model contracts must either
take such regimes into account or ignore them. The ICC has certain-
ly taken into account antitrust law when drafting some of its model
contracts. The ICC Model Distributorship Contract is a good exam-
ple.218 Although it provides for the application of lex mercatoria,219
the potential application of antitrust law has led the drafters to in-
clude options from which the parties must choose depending on
whether they are concerned with the application of antitrust law. 220
What is unclear, however, is whether the options offered by the
drafters are meant to ensure that the relevant contract comports with
all antitrust laws or simply with certain ones. 221
The ICC's decision to promote lex mercatoria can, therefore,
be explained by its desire to reduce its model contracts' production
costs. Like every other product or service provider, the ICC would
like to reduce production costs for its various products intended for
sale. As a seller of international model contracts, it is bound to incur
some cost in verifying whether its models are valid and enforceable
under applicable mandatory rules. One way to limit those costs is to
first provide for the application of a single national law, and to then
verify that its contracts comply with the mandatory rules of that par-
ticular law. Many trade associations have made precisely that choice,
217. Compare, however, Hugh Collins, who seems genuinely surprised that U.S.
insolvency law could displace contractual provisions contained in the ISDA Master
Agreement. Collins, supra note 22.
218. MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT, supra note 189.
219. Id. art. 24.1.A.
220. See, e.g., id. art. 11 (Resale Prices), art. 12 (Sales Outside the Territory), and art. 16
(Sole Distributorship).
221. It is unclear, for instance, whether the options offered are meant to be compliant
with both U.S. and E.U. competition laws. Some U.S. lawyers have argued that the focus
was, at least for certain model contracts, only European law. See, e.g., Carl E. Zwisler,
Amended ICC Model International Franchise Contract is Problematic for Franchising,
INT'L FRANCHISE Assoc., http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-Industry-News-Detail.aspx?
id=54643 (last visited on Nov. 8, 2012).
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by applying English law to their model contracts. 222 However, the
choice of one particular law might not always be acceptable to all
commercial parties in a given industry. To address that issue, organ-
izations producing model contracts might opt to incur the costs of
verifying the enforceability of their contracts under only a limited
number of national laws that correspond to the particular industry's
leading centers. 223 But even an expanded choice of potential national
laws might not work for certain norm producers working in broad
and far-reaching fields without leading centers. As it is prohibitively
expensive to even attempt to verify the enforceability of such an enti-
ty's norms against the mandatory rules of hundreds of national laws,
the only remaining solution is to avert the problem by preventing the
potential application of such mandatory rules. The ICC chose that
path, relying on the application of lex mercatoria to attempt to reach
this goal.
The ICC's effort to promote lex mercatoria in its model con-
tracts is less problematic than its unfortunate decision to allow arbi-
trators to declare lex mercatoria applicable when the parties have not
spoken, which creates genuine agency problems threatening the legit-
imacy of international arbitration as a whole. Model language is only
binding on the parties if they choose to incorporate it in their ultimate
contract, so a suggested choice of law clause applying lex mercatoria
will only apply if accepted and incorporated by the parties. Moreo-
ver, although the ICC model contract drafters might encourage par-
ties to refrain from choosing national law, they still typically offer the
parties the option to do so. Parties choosing lex mercatoria in their
contract, then, do so knowingly and voluntarily, such that one can
reasonably presume that such parties have selected their preferred le-
gal regime to govern it. Available data suggests, however, that lex
mercatoria is not (and never has been) the preferred legal regime of
international commercial actors. The ICC model contracts rightly
notify parties that the lex mercatoria clauses will only be enforced by
arbitral tribunals; parties choosing such clauses must, therefore, also
include an arbitration clause (which, in all likelihood, will specify
ICC arbitration). The ICC data, however, reveals that parties to ICC
arbitrations choose non-national law in only 1% of the cases. 224
Clearly, the lex mercatoria clauses in the ICC's model contracts do
222. See, for example, GAFTA's model contracts, such as the General Contract for
Grain in Bulk, supra note 17.
223. This path has been followed in the finance industry. The enforceability of the
ISDA Master Agreement was verified with respect to several national laws. See notes 20-27
and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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not appeal to the vast majority of commercial parties.
The question as to why those clauses are so unappealing re-
mains to be answered. It may simply represent a distaste for the par-
ticular clauses offered in the ICC model contracts, or it may very
well reflect a much more fundamental, general hostility to the appli-
cation of lex mercatoria as a non-national legal regime in interna-
tional contracts. The most common ICC lex mercatoria clauses es-
tablish three sets of norms to be applied in descending order: the first
set is "the rules and principles of law generally recognized in interna-
tional trade as applicable to international contracts"; the second is
trade usages; and the third is the UNIDROIT Principles. 225 Trade us-
ages and UNIDROIT Principles are thus to be applied subsidiarily-
that is, if and only if the dispute cannot otherwise be resolved by ap-
plying the first set of norms. Despite the reference to the UNIDROIT
Principles, the clause directs the arbitrators to first apply "rules and
principles of law generally recognized in international trade," an ob-
vious reference to lex mercatoria developed by continental scholars
over the last fifty years, with its numerous and complex sources. 226
Given its lack of precision, as well as the broad discretion its applica-
tion gives to the arbitrators (arguably as broad as the authority to de-
cide ex aequo et bono), it is unsurprising that most commercial par-
ties find it unappealing. 227 Moreover, the directive of the provision
providing for the application of the three sets of norms in a particular
"order" is not as clear as it seems. Professor Bortolotti, who was in-
volved in the drafting of a number of these model contracts, argues
that the correct order of the three sources is hierarchical. 228 Sources
lower in the hierarchy should only be applied if compliant with
sources higher in the hierarchy. Trade usages and the UNIDROIT
Principles might therefore only be applied if "they conform with
general principles (lex mercatoria),"229 and "arbitrators may thus re-
fuse to apply the provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles that they
consider not to be in accordance with the reasonable expectations of
business people engaged in international trade." 230  If Professor
Bortolotti's interpretation were widely adopted, parties could not
even rely on the application of the UNIDROIT Principles, as arbitra-
tors would have the discretion to displace them for alleged noncom-
225. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
228. Bortolotti, supra note 209, at 62.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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pliance with the general principles of international trade. Such a
clause would not provide any legal certainty.
In light of the apparent distaste international commercial ac-
tors have for lex mercatoria, one cannot help but wonder whether the
future of transnational commercial law does not lie instead in detailed
and coherent international restatements of contract law. Perhaps if
the lex mercatoria clauses in the ICC model contracts only applied
the UNIDROIT Principles (or, alternatively, if the ICC reversed the
order of application, such that the UNIDROIT Principles applied
first), commercial parties might worry less about legal uncertainty
and more readily enjoy the cost savings associated with not having to
verify that their contract comports with the mandatory rules of the
relevant national law. The present clause does refer to the
UNIDROIT Principles, but only as a subsidiary solution available to
supplement "rules and principles generally recognized in internation-
al trade." Given the limited success of the ICC's current clause, the
ICC should include clauses referring to a single, clear, and detailed
transnational commercial law regime, either as the sole option, or as
the first set of norms to be applied.
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